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 One of the central elements of the spiritual and metaphysical worldview of Christianity 
is the seeming paradox of God’s closeness yet otherness. In both the Old and New Testaments, 
the transcendence of God is affirmed, sometimes with rather strong terms. This can be seen in 
the words of Isaiah 55:9 (“As the heavens are above the earth, so are My Ways above your 
ways, and My Thoughts above your thoughts”), 2 Chronicles 2:6 (“...[T]he heavens and even 
the highest heavens cannot contain Him”), and Acts 17:24 (“The God Who made the world and 
all that is in it...does not dwell in sanctuaries made by human hands”). In the sixth chapter of 
the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, the prophet who authored this book describes a vision of God 
that he had, in which God is seen seated upon a throne, as angels praise Him. Cyril of 
Alexandria, commenting on this verse in the A.D. 5th century, writes that the angels praising 
God signifies the “eminent dignity of God”1 which “surpasses every spiritual nature”.2 He goes 
on to write, “His being seated on it [the heavenly throne] probably suggests as it were the 
stability, permanence, and the continuance in the quality of such good things. … [W]hile 
created nature is always and at every time subject to corruption...the Wisdom that is Artificer 
and Creator of all things is enthroned, as I said, that is, has a permanent enjoyment of such 
things.”3 That is to say, the loftiness of God’s heavenly throne symbolizes the eternal, 
unending and transcendent nature of God, in contrast to the finite and passing nature of the 
 
1 St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on Isaiah, vol. 1, trans. by Robert Charles Hill (Brookline: Holy Cross 
Orthodox Press, 2006), pg. 144. 
 
2 Ibid., pg. 145. 
 
3 Ibid.  
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things of this world. What the angels cried out to God in praising Him - “Holy, holy, holy, 
Lord God of hosts” - is also theologically significant. The Catholic Biblical scholars Joseph 
Jensen and William H. Irwin, commenting on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, note that God’s 
holiness is central to the Prophet Isaiah’s message, so much so that it is seen by Isaiah as the 
“predominant attribute” of the God of Israel. What is more, Jensen and Irwin note the nature of 
this holiness: “Moral perfection is included [within Isaiah’s definition of holiness], but 
primarily it refers to His transcendence and otherness.”4 Yet, Scripture also affirms the 
closeness of God. In Psalm 145:18, it is written, “The Lord is near to all who call upon Him.”  
 Scripture affirms that God is both close yet transcendent in an epistemic sense as well. 
In Exodus 33, Moses asks that God manifest His Goodness to him. God agrees, but says that as 
He makes His Goodness pass before Moses, He will block Moses’s vision so that he will only 
see His Back and not His Face, God’s Face representing the fullest or most direct manifestation 
of God to creation, and His Back representing a lesser or more indirect manifestation of God. 
The reason for this God makes clear: “The LORD answered: ‘I will make My Goodness pass 
before you...But you cannot see My Face, for no one can see Me and live.” (Exodus 33:19, 20) 
God’s Goodness is so great that one would die if they were to lay eyes upon It in Its fullness. 
Paul builds on this theme by describing God as One “Whom no human being has or can see” (1 
Timothy 6:16). Nonetheless, two verses earlier, Paul writes that those who persevere in the 
obeying of God’s commandments will, in the eschaton, have God manifested to them (1 
Timothy 6:14). This parallels the words of Christ Himself in Matthew 5:8, wherein it is written 
that the pure in heart will see God. God, in Himself, cannot be seen by humans; yet, through 
 
4 Joseph Jensen, O.S.B. and William H. Irwin, C.S.B., “Isaiah 1-39,” in The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, 
edited by Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., and Roland E. Murphy, O.Carm. (Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall, 1990), pg. 234. 
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growth in holiness, we purify the mind and the heart so as to become capable of seeing, albeit 
faintly, That which is incomprehensible to created realities. 
 In certain texts of Scripture, the metaphysical and epistemological elements intersect. In 
1 John 3:2, it is written, “Beloved, we are God’s children now; what we shall be has not yet 
been revealed. We do know that when it is revealed we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him 
as He is.” By grace, we are reconciled with God, and therefore made children of God. Yet, the 
spiritual and ontological state of the faithful in this life does not represent their final state. In 
heaven, they shall stand before God and comprehend Him to the fullest extent that the human 
mind is capable. The Apostle John, in this text, does not deny the transcendence of God; 
nonetheless, God’s transcendence does not undermine the ability of God, by His grace, to bring 
about an intimate knowledge of and union with God on the part of creatures. And such union 
and knowledge not only adds to our doctrine or philosophy of God, but says something about 
man: the knowledge of God transforms us to make us like God. We become conformed to the 
object of our knowledge. 
 Thus, the core of the Christian worldview is a belief in a God Who is transcendent and 
yet, in spite of His transcendence, is close to His creation, a God Who, in Himself, is 
incomprehensible, and yet makes Himself known to His creation. This paradox is only 
intensified with the central teaching of Scripture, the doctrine of the Incarnation. Nonetheless, 
such a worldview raises a series of questions, such as: “How can the same God be both 
transcendent AND immanent?” “How can there be any relationship between a finite being such 
as humans and an infinite, transcendent Being such as God?” “How can a finite reality such as 
the human mind comprehend an infinite Reality such as God, even in the faintest or most 
indirect manner?” These questions are only intensified when one examines the Christian view 
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of the afterlife: the human person, by the grace of God, is in a state of perfect union with God, 
in which they are in the direct presence of their Creator, and therefore comprehend God as 
directly or as fully as the human mind is capable.  
 The fact that many of the same questions that one sees when examining the Christian 
doctrine of creation, and by extension the more general metaphysical relationship between God 
and humans, carry over into the realm of soteriology draws our attention towards an important 
point: namely, the close doctrinal relationship between these two fields of theology. Heaven is 
a supernatural state, that is, it transcends the created order. Theologians, when discussing this 
topic, thus tend to emphasize the radical difference between the state of nature and the deified 
state. It is important here to briefly defined what is meant by deification. Deification, in a 
word, refers to the union with God brought about by grace. Such a union includes a perfection 
of the image of God within the human person, so that the human person is more closely 
conformed to God. Such a state is perfected only in heaven; nonetheless, the process of being 
deified begins with the reception of grace in this life. 
While such an understanding of the relationship between the natural and supernatural 
realms holds true on an ontological level, it will be argued in this paper that such a sharp 
distinction cannot be made on a systematic level between the natural and the supernatural, 
between what God does in creating and sustaining our existence and what God does in deifying 
it. On a purely systematic or theoretical level, deification does not make sense without the 
doctrine of creation, for the doctrine of deification presupposes - albeit while also transforming 
and elevating - certain ideas first put forward in the Christian doctrine of creation, Christian 
metaphysics, and Christian anthropology. In particular, I will be examining how this is true 
with two specific theologians, namely Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas. The reason why 
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these two theologians will be the subject of our analysis is that they are representative of the 
two largest traditions within classical Christian thought, namely the Latin and Byzantine, and 
more specifically these two thinkers lived at a time in which a great level of systematic nuance 
was being added to the thought of these traditions. Because these two thinkers frequently 
attempted to synthesize together and build off of the thought of various writers and intellectual 
traditions - Biblical, Patristic, and pre-Christian - there will be contained within our analysis of 
Aquinas and Palamas a brief analysis of the various thought traditions they made use of. 
What will be argued for in this thesis that the doctrine of deification presupposes a 
certain metaphysics and anthropology which touches at the core of the Christian worldview. 
The point that I hope to demonstrate is that talk of deification cannot take place without having 
a specific and well-defined doctrine of creation and the relationship between God and the 
created realm, and between God and humanity in specific; in fact, the former is impossible 
without the latter. The emphasis of this paper is therefore systematic, that is, it is not making 
any metaphysical claims on the nature of creation or the nature of deification, but rather is 
meant to examine how the doctrine of deification builds off of and is informed by the 













DEFINING DEIFICATION - A BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 Before we begin with our exploration of how the doctrine of creation and the doctrine 
of deification relate, we must first briefly define what constitutes deification. In particular, let 
us focus on the Biblical and Patristic sources of the doctrine deification. One of the first major 
elements of deification, as articulated in Scripture and the Fathers, is union with Christ. 
Throughout the Bible, one sees references to the faithful being “in Christ” and Christ being “in 
them.” In his letter to the Romans, Paul provides an in-depth analysis of what it means to be 
“in Christ,” writing: “Miserable wretch that I am! Who will deliver me from this mortal body? 
Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord. I myself, with my mind, serve the Law of 
God but, with my flesh, the law of sin. Hence, now there is no condemnation for those who are 
in Christ Jesus. For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed you from the law of sin 
and death.” (Romans 7:24-8:2) These verses dovetails with of Paul’s description of the state of 
the sinner in Romans 7, in which the sinner is torn between two principles within himself, 
which Paul labels “laws”: the law of the flesh, which represents the disordered desires that 
arise as a result of sin, and the law of the mind, that is, the human person’s comprehension of 
the commands of God. The sinner desires to do what is right, but is constantly prevented from 
fully doing so by his own sinful tendencies. Yet, Paul gives thanks to God for what He did in 
Christ, since for those who are “in Christ,” there is “no condemnation.” That is to say, as 
Joseph Fitzmyer explains in his commentary on Romans, the human race, due to its sinfulness, 
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has incurred the curse of God’s punishment. Yet, Fitzmyer points out, chapter 8 of Romans 
parallels Romans 5:1-11, which depicts Christ’s saving mission as a manifestation of God’s 
love, which is liberative in nature. What Christ’s saving act does is “rescue” us from sin (to use 
Fitzmyer’s language), and through faith we are united to Christ, as a result of which we are 
filled with the Holy Spirit.5 The Holy Spirit allows us to escape the tug-of-war that exists 
within the individual between the law of the flesh and that of the mind, thereby allowing one to 
live in a manner pleasing to God. 
 In line with this larger theme are the words of our Lord Himself in John 6. As Pheme 
Perkins notes in her commentary on John’s Gospel, the Bread of Life discourse speaks of true 
spiritual life both as a present and as a future reality. In verse 40, Jesus says that those who 
believe in Him “have eternal life” (a present reality) and “will be raised up in the last day” (a 
future reality). In verse 54, this sentiment is repeated almost verbatim. The language of both 
future and realized eschatology is used - that is to say, the faithful have been spiritually 
renewed in the here and now, and have the pledge of eternal life in the next life.6 The reason 
for this is this is expressly articulated by Christ: “Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood 
remains in Me and I in him.” (John 6:56). 
 The fullness of spiritual life is a result of union with Christ, which is described 
simultaneously as being both “in Christ” and having Christ “in us.” Scripture describes this 
union with Christ, and the eternal life that this brings about, in rather strong terms, in the 
second letter of St. Peter. In chapter 1, verses 3 through 4, it is written, “His Divine Power has 
bestowed on us everything that makes for life and devotion, through the knowledge of Him 
 
5 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “The Letter to the Romans,” in The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, pg. 852. 
 
6 Pheme Perkins, “The Gospel According to John,” in The New Jerome Biblical Commentary, pg. 962. 
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Who has called us through His Power and Glory. Through these, He has bestowed on us the 
precious and very great promises, so that through them you may come to share in the Divine 
Nature, after escaping from the corruption that is in the world due to evil desire.” Descriptions 
of union with God of this nature call to mind two other major themes, namely how union with 
God through Christ brings about purification from the effects of sin and, secondly, the vision of 
salvation as a participation in the Divine Nature. We are called by God to live lives of holiness 
and devotion, and God, in His Mercy and grace, has bestowed onto us everything needed to 
properly respond to this call. Contained within God’s call to holiness, and the gifts which He 
bestows, is the promise that those who respond to God’s call and make use of His gifts - and in 
doing so overcome all corruption and evil desire - will become partakers in the Divine Nature.  
 What one sees in these and similar verses is the following: 1) through union with 
Christ, the believer is purified of the corruption that results from sin; 2) one who has been so 
regenerated is given the ability to live a life pleasing to God; 3) the culmination of a life of 
holiness is participation in the Divine Nature. Various Patristic thinkers have attempted to 
explain what this participation in the Divine Nature means by using what some scholars have 
called the “Great Exchange Theory,” which emphasizes the reciprocal nature of God’s plan of 
salvation. God partook in the things of humanity so that humanity could partake in the things 
of God; God, through His descent and self-emptying, made possible the elevation and 
glorification of the human race. 
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In both Justin7 and Irenaeus8 (writing in the A.D. 2nd century), what one sees is the 
belief that immortality and incorruption are proper to God alone, and are present in humans in 
a contingent manner, that is, insofar as man is united to God. Through our disobedience, death 
and corruption entered into the human condition. The purpose of the Incarnation was to restore 
incorruptibility and immortality in the human race. Justin, for example, references such verses 
as Isaiah 14:1, which states that the Gentiles shall be united to the House of Israel, and Isaiah 
42:1-4, which states that God will place Jacob as the judge of the nations, the one Who will 
make manifest God’s Truth and Justice, and in whom even the Gentiles will trust. Justin argues 
that these prophecies have been fulfilled in Christ, in Whom the covenant between God and 
Israel has been fulfilled, and all who have faith in Christ are considered God’s people. Justin 
goes further and makes a more radical claim: that those who are members of the covenant 
through their faith in Jesus are sons of God. Through obedience to God, we are united to God, 
and therefore are rightfully called sons of God; but, through sin and disobedience of the Divine 
commands, we become subject to suffering and death. As Justin writes, “...[T]hey [humans] 
were made like God, free from suffering and death, provided they kept His commandments, 
and were deemed deserving of the name of His sons, and yet they, becoming like Adam and 
Eve, work out death for themselves…”9 Through union with Christ we regain the spiritual 
purity lost through sin, and therefore begin the process of regaining the incorruptibility and 
 
7 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, chapter 123-124, trans. by Marcus Dods and George Reith, in The Ante-
Nicene Fathers, vol. 1 (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885). Accessed on: 
https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01288.htm. 
 
8 St. Irenaeus of Lyons, Against the Heresies, Book III, chapter 19, translated by Alexander Roberts and William 
Rabaut, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1 (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing, Co., 1885). Accessed on: 
https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103319.htm. 
 




immortality lost through sin. It is through the act of regaining this lost incorruptibility and 
immortality through union with Christ that we become sons of God. Justin explains what this 
means by asserting that the relationship between the faithful Christian and Christ is akin to the 
relationship between the individual Jew and Israel: just as the individual member of the nation 
of Israel is a descendent of Israel, and therefore is called Israel because they are, in a sense, “of 
Israel,” likewise faithful members of the New Covenant bear the name of “Christian” since 
they, by grace, are “of Christ.” As such, we participate in the things of Christ: Christ is the Son 
of God, and Christians, through our union with Christ, become sons of God. Justin thus states 
that humans, by grace, become “sons of God,” and therefore “are deemed worthy of becoming 
gods” (terminology Justin bases on the words of Psalm 82:1), that is to say, participants in the 
Divine Nature.10  
Irenaeus takes a view similar to that of Justin, in that both Justin and Irenaeus see 
deification in terms of incorruptibility and immortality that results from union with God 
through Christ and obedience to the Divine commandments. Yet, the method by which 
Irenaeus argues this point is, in some places, different; whereas Justin, in Against Trypho, was 
arguing against the Jewish claims against the Messianic identity of Jesus, Irenaeus was writing 
against the denial of Jesus’ Divinity more generally. Irenaeus argues that Jesus could not free 
us from the bondage of sin unless He was the Word of God made man. The Word of God is 
“incorruptible” by nature, but humans are incorruptible only insofar as we are united to the 
Word of God. By becoming human, this incorruptible Word, Who is the Source of eternal life 
elevates human nature so as to make union with God possible. We, in a word, become what 
Christ is by virtue of union with Christ, and thus we are what Christ is in a derivative sense. 
 




The Word of God is the Source of all incorruption and immortality, and we become 
incorruptible and immortal by virtue of our union with Christ, Who by His Incarnation, Death 
and Resurrection “swallowed up” that which was corruptible and mortal. Jesus is the Son of 
God, and we become sons of God by virtue of our union with Jesus. By denying the Divinity of 
Jesus, the faithless, Irenaeus says, “remain in mortal flesh,” “are debtors to death,” and 
“defraud human nature of promotion into God.”11 Here, Irenaeus comes to a lot of the same 
conclusions that Justin does, but through slightly different lines of argumentation, which he 
puts forward on account of his different ideological opponents.  
Athanasius, a little under two centuries after these writers, unpacks the philosophical 
underpinnings of this teaching in his defense of Nicene orthodoxy. God is the Source of all 
being and existence, and sin is a turning away from God; sin, therefore, is a turning away from 
the Source of all being and existence and a turn towards nothingness. Athanasius identifies evil 
with non-being in the sense that it is a corruption of being. Evil results not only in 
metaphysical corruption, but also epistemological corruption: sin fogs mankind’s knowledge of 
God, which causes sin to be self-perpetuating. God became man in the person of Jesus for two 
reasons: firstly, by uniting human nature to His Divinity, He restored human nature; secondly, 
since God is He in Whose Image we were created, in the Incarnation what one sees is 
humanity’s Divine archetype appearing to man in the most immanent manner, allowing man to 
know his Creator with ever greater clarity.12  
 
11 St. Irenaeus of Lyons, Against the Heresies, Book III, chapter 19 
 
12 St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation, translated by John Behr (Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 




Augustine, in a Christmas sermon delivered between A.D. 412 and A.D. 416, said that 
had not Christ been incarnate, the ultimate destiny of the human race would be death. What 
one sees in Christ is Truth and Justice itself entering into the created order for the sake of 
restoring it.13 One possible manner of interpreting these words is, through sin, humanity 
abandons truth and justice, and therefore incurs corruption. Jesus, as God, is the eternal Source 
and Foundation of truth and justice, and through uniting created realities to Himself in one 
Person through the Incarnation, He restores truth and justice within the human race and within 
the creation more generally. 
In these various Biblical and Patristic texts, there is an overarching view, namely that 
deification includes a union with God through Christ, a union whereby humanity overcomes 
the corruption caused by sin and becomes more receptive to the Perfections of God. The 
Perfections of God - being, goodness, virtue, wisdom, etc. - are found in beings outside of God, 
but only insofar as God shares His Perfections with His creation, which in turn implies a 
certain receptivity to the Divine Perfections on the part of created beings. As a result of sin, the 
human race becomes alienated from God, and therefore its ability to receive, reflect, and 
participate in the Perfections of God is inhibited, and as a result human existence is corrupted. 
The process whereby God deifies the human person is ultimately a process whereby God 
reestablishes union with humanity, allowing the human person to participate in the Perfections 
of God to ever greater degrees. The final state of the process of deification is perfect union 
with God, whereby we have a perfect receptivity to the Perfections of God, and therefore the 
ability to perfectly imitate God.  
 
13 St. Augustine, “Sermon 185,” in Ancient Christian Writers series, vol. 15 (Sermons for Christmas and 




This is the working definition of deification presupposed by this paper. It is also present 
in the thought both Aquinas and Palamas. In Thomistic anthropology, the imago Dei rests in 
the human capacity to love God and to know Him in a manner analogous to God’s knowledge 
and love of us and His knowledge and love of Himself.14 In knowing God and loving God, we 
imitate God. The entire spiritual life for Aquinas is a continuous process of imitating God to 
ever greater degrees. Thomas frames the spiritual life in terms of humans becoming more 
likened unto God. Aquinas, in his treatise on grace, states that grace is an expression of that 
love on the part of God whereby God desires not only natural goods, but man’s highest good, 
namely union with Him. In the act of granting us His spiritual gifts, God brings it about that 
this should be accomplished. Thomas therefore writes that by grace God “draws the rational 
creature above the condition of its nature to the participation of the Divine Good.”15 
A similar implication is also found in one of the definitions of deification found in the 
works of Gregory Palamas. In the Triads III.1.28, Palamas writes, “Deification is an 
enhypostatic and direct illumination which has no beginning but appears in those worthy as 
something exceeding their comprehension. It is indeed a mystical union with God beyond 
intellect and reason, in the age when creatures will no longer know corruption.”16 In the same 
section of the Triads where Palamas puts forward this definition, he further goes on to say that 
 
14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ I, Q. 93, A. 6 respondeo, translated by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1981), pg. 472. 
 
15 Ibid., Summa Theologiæ I-II, Q. 110, A. 1, respondeo, pg. 1132. 
 
16 Gregory Palamas, Triads III.1.28, translated by Nicholas Gendle, edited by John Meyendorff (Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 1983), pg. 84. Such a definition is not Palamas’s own; he claims to borrow it from Maximos the Confessor. 
John Meyendorff, in his translation of the text, claims that the exact location of this quote in the works of 
Maximos is uncertain, whereas Nicholas Gendle asserts that this definition is derived from Maximos’s work 
Quaestiones ad Thalassium. See  A.N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pg. 105, footnote 6; see also Gregory Palamas, Triads, translated by 




the saints in heaven are “observing the light of the hidden and more-than-ineffable Glory,” and 
therefore “are able to receive the blessed purity”.17 Deification, in Palamite theology, is a result 
of the human person entering into a deeper union with God, as a result of which the human 
intellect becomes enlightened by the Light of Divine Glory. The more the human person 
perceives the Divine Glory, the more we are purified of the corruption of sin and are therefore 
rendered capable of partaking in or imitating the purity that defines the Inner Life of God.  
Deification therefore includes three elements: firstly, union with God through Christ; 
secondly, overcoming corruption and mortality; and finally, a greater imitation of or 
participation in the Perfections of God. Such a definition is at least implicitly found to some 
degree in the various Biblical and Patristic treatments of deification, and is present in both 
Thomistic and Palamite thought. It is this definition which will be presupposed in the analysis 
that follows. We will dedicate one chapter to Thomas Aquinas, and another to Gregory 
Palamas. Each chapter will in turn be subdivided into sections concerning: firstly, their view on 
the relationship between God and creation; secondly, their respective views on human nature; 
and finally, their views on grace, by which human nature is deified, and how their views on 
deification build off of their respective views on creation. Finally, I will conclude with a side-












CHAPTER 2:  
THE THOMISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF DEIFICATION 
In this chapter we will analyze Aquinas’s understanding of deification and its doctrinal 
or systematic relation to the of creation. For Thomas, both the doctrine of creation and that of 
deification are rooted in the notion of analogous participation. The vision of human nature and 
that of grace held by the Angelic Doctor serve as a bridge between these two areas of his 
theology (namely, creation and deification): humans, being created in God’s image, are capable 
of a level of participation that goes beyond what non-rational creatures are capable of; yet, 
since deification is a supernatural end, that towards which the imago Dei is oriented is 
actualized only through grace and the moral and spiritual capacities it infuses into the soul. We 
will now proceed to an analysis of Thomas’s thought on these matters, beginning with his view 
on the philosophical and theological parameters surrounding the concept of “participation.” 
 
Participation 
 In order to make sense of the Thomistic doctrine of deification, we must first 
understand the broad metaphysical parameters of the Thomistic worldview, and in particular 
the Thomistic view of creation. The Thomistic understanding of creation is defined by a 
specific understanding of the metaphysical relationship between God and creation. Thomas’s 
view on the matter is one that centers on the concept of participation. He states explicitly what 
his view is in Question 44, Article 1 of the Summa Theologiae in which Aquinas deals with the 
doctrine of creation: “I answer that, it must be said that being in any way existing is from God. 
16 
 
For whatever is found in anything by way of participation, must be caused in it by that to 
which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire.”18 Just as metal is hot only insofar 
as it participates in the heat of fire, likewise created things only have existence and the things 
predicated onto it insofar as they participate in that which has these things necessarily or 
essentially. 
 In a sense, the participation model of creation is shared by many Christian schools, both 
East and West, throughout the Patristic, Medieval, and even to some extent the modern era. 
The Catholic theologian Paul J. Griffiths outlines the philosophical parameters of the concept 
of participation in the following terms: 
 
Participation is therefore a peculiar relation: its virtue is to permit you to 
partake of (to share in) some quality or property not proper to your own nature 
- a quality you would not possess were you not to gain it by participation, and 
which comes, ideal-typically at least, from what and where you are not, as a 
gift.19 
 
The Reformed theologian Najeeb Awad says something similar, providing more detail by 
adding that creatures are what they are “by virtue of being caused by God as God’s creature.”20 
In a word, if the ontological foundation of one’s existence, goodness, virtue, or wisdom are not 
within oneself, it must be traced back to some source outside of the self. Put another way, 
 
18  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ I, Q. 44, A. 1 respondeo, pg. 229. 
 
19 Paul Griffiths, “Participation,” in Intellectual Appetite: A Theological Grammar, by Paul Griffiths (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), pg. 77. 
 
20 Najeeb Awad, “Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of ‘Relation’ and ‘Participation’ and Contemporary Trinitarian 
Theology,” in The New Blackfriars, vol. 93, no. 1048 (November 2012), pg. 664. 
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when one looks at beings within what Christians would call the created realm (humans, angels, 
plants, animals, books, rocks, automobiles, etc.), there is a difference between the subjects in 
question, considered in themselves, and the qualities predicated of them. The concept of 
“human” and that of “existence” or “goodness” are distinct. A given human person represents a 
specific instantiation of goodness or existence. Insofar as there is a difference between 
goodness, or wisdom, or existence considered in itself and the specific instantiations of these 
predicates, this leads to the question of what the source of these predicates is. Insofar as these 
attributes are objective realities, they must have an ontological origin or foundation which 
allows for their existence. Such a Reality Christians call God. These perfections exist in God in 
a proper sense, that is, they have their origin in God, and have no existence independent of 
God. 
 Creaturely existence and all that is predicated of it is thus intrinsically derivative in 
nature. Created beings exist because all that they have originates in God and is shared by God 
to creation; the manner in which they exist is determined by the manner or extent to which God 
shares His Perfections with creation. The question now remains: how is it that created beings 
can share in the Perfections of God? Part of Thomas’s answer is rooted in his view of God. For 
Aquinas, God is not one being among many, but rather can be described as ipsum esse 
subsistens (“being subsistent in itself”), Who transcends all the different modes of being found 
within creation. In this sense, Thomas is not unique, but rather is building off of certain trends 
found in Patristic thought. Augustine, for example, writes, 
 
For God is existence in a supreme degree - He supremely is - and He is 
therefore immutable. Hence He gave existence to the creatures He made out 
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of nothing; but it was not His own supreme existence. To some He gave 
existence in a higher degree, to some in a lower, and thus arranged a scale of 
existences of various natures. … Thus, to this highest existence, from which 
all other things that are derive their existence, the only contrary nature is non-
existence.21 
 
Augustine is here asserting that God is existence “to a supreme degree.” What this supreme 
degree of existence implies for Augustine is that it is not opposed to any other mode of being. 
That is to say, this “highest existence” or “supreme degree” of existence is not one category of 
being among many, the alternative to which is some other category of being; rather, the only 
thing that stands in opposition to supreme being is non-being. The highest degree of existence 
is not one type of existence, but rather is that from which all other modes of existence come 
forth. 
 One sees a similar view put forward in other Church Fathers. Maximos the Confessor 
writes that God is not “a substance, meant as unqualified or qualified substance”. The term 
used here for “substance,” in Greek, was ούσια, a term which had a multiplicity of distinct 
though related meanings, including “substance,” “quality or property,” and “essence,” and had 
distant etymological ties to the Greek term for “to be.” As with Augustine, Maximos does not 
see God as being defined by a specific mode of being, but rather as that which lays the basis 
for all other modes of being, which is why he goes on to assert that God is a “substance-
 





causing Reality while beyond substance”.22 God transcends all specific substances and modes 
of being, and even the very concept of substance itself. It is for this reason that Maximos says 
that God is neither a “qualified substance” (a substance whose existence is defined by certain 
specific ontological parameters), nor is God even an “unqualified substance” (a substance 
whose existence is not defined by any of the limits found in creaturely existence). Since God 
transcends all concepts and modes of being associated with the created realm, Maximos is 
therefore hesitant to apply any creaturely descriptors to God, even with the provision that 
within God they are without limit. The reason for this is that Maximos fears that this may lead 
to a vision of God wherein God is simply a larger or unbounded version of what one sees in 
creation. While Maximos’s approach is rooted in certain trends unique in Eastern thought, 
which we will explore in the following chapter (see chapter 3.1), what Maximos shares in 
common with Augustine is the belief that God is not limited to or by any of the modes of being 
found in the created realm. John of Damascus, writing a century after Maximos, continues this 
larger trend found in both Augustine and Maximos, saying that God’s Being can be seen as 
“comprehending all in Itself”, and that, as a result, it “contains existence itself as an infinite sea 
of substance”.23 The Divine Substance does not fall under a specific mode, but rather is 
infinite, which implies, for John, that it transcends all specific categories. All specific modes of 
existence are, in a sense, contained within God, insofar as God is their cause. 
 
22 Maximos the Confessor, Two Hundred Chapters on Theology, Book I, century 4, trans. by Luis Joshua Salés 
(Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2015) pg. 45. 
 
23 John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, Book I, chapter 9, trans. By E.W. Watson and L. Pullan, in The 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 9 (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1899). Accessed on: 
https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3304.htm. This text is also explicitly quoted by Thomas Aquinas in Summa 




 Aquinas’s vision of God is thoroughly in line with this general trend. Aquinas, though, 
has an unique way of articulating this particular train of thought. For Aquinas, God is not a 
composite Being. God cannot, for instance, consist in the composition of act and potency, for 
there is no potency in God. Further, it cannot be said that God’s Being includes any other 
distinction besides the act-potency distinction, since all distinctions presuppose some prior 
potency that unites the distinct parts. What is more, distinctions within a thing presuppose the 
existence of someone or something else outside of the subject in question that brought all the 
parts together, and composition includes the possibility of decomposition, both of which go 
against God’s Nature as the eternal and unending Foundation of all being and existence. As 
Aquinas writes,  
 
Their parts [that is, the different parts of composite beings], likewise, are 
brought together as being in potency in respect to the union...But in God, there 
is no potency. Therefore, there is no composition in Him. … Every composite, 
furthermore, is potentially dissoluble. This arises from the nature of 
composition...Now, what is dissoluble can not-be. This does not fit God, since 
He is through Himself the necessary Being. There is, therefore, no 
composition in God.24 
 
Further, Aquinas notes that matter is what allows for a specific instantiation of certain qualities 
or essences. Yet, since God is immaterial, the Divine Essence, Aquinas notes, “exists through 
 
24 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles,  Book I, chapter 18, translated by Anton C. Pegis, F.R.S.C. (Notre 




Itself as a singular existent and individuated through Itself”.25 A point of metaphysical nuance 
is necessary here: just because a being is incorporeal does not mean it is without parts. 
Incorporeal or spiritual substances simply lack the distinction between matter and form, as well 
as the sort of distinctions that concern physical existence. Aquinas notes that the absence of the 
matter-form distinction does not negate the existence of other distinctions within a being, 
including the essence-existence or act-potency distinction. This is the case, for example, with 
angels. Thomas, in the Summa Theologiæ, quotes from Ambrose of Milan, who states that the 
sorts of limitations that apply to physical beings do not apply to angels, who are incorporeal; 
yet, there are certain metaphysical (what Ambrose calls “substantial”, or what Aquinas calls 
“essential”) limits on their being. That is to say, there are certain metaphysical principles that 
apply to other created beings that also apply to angels.26 Incorporeal thus does not mean 
without distinctions. Yet, the fact that no distinction exists between matter and form in God 
points towards a broader, and more radical, point for Aquinas. It is not only that God is not 
physical, but, more generally, there is nothing outside of God’s form or essence that actualizes 
the essence. It is for this reason that Aquinas denies the matter-form distinction in God. It is for 
this same reason that Aquinas also denies the essence-existence distinction within God: God 
has both Essence and Existence; yet, God’s Existence is not ontologically distinct from the 
Essence. Whatever God is, definitionally, substantially, or essentially, God’s Existence is that. 
God’s Existence is not merely a specific instantiation of that; rather, God is His own Essence. 
There is thus no distinction between God and His Essence, or between God and the various 
 
25 Ibid., Book I, chapter I, pg. 117. 
 
26 Ibid., Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, chapter 54, pg. 156-158; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ I, Q. 50, 




Qualities or Perfections predicated of Him, just as conversely there is a distinction between 
Socrates, for example, and his humanity.  
This leads one to an important element of Thomistic thought: namely the doctrine of 
Divine simplicity. In the writings of Thomas, as well as Thomism more generally, it is asserted 
that the human mind speaks of the different aspects of God’s Existence as if they were 
different since the created world, being finite and composite by nature, reflects the perfections 
of God in what some have described as a “refractory” manner.27 It is easy to find a justification 
for such a belief in the words of Thomas himself, who wrote that the Perfections of God “pre-
exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and multiplied and 
divided”.28 Peter Totleben, commenting on the Thomistic understanding of God within the 
context of the debates between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, notes that the 
different aspects of God’s Existence “sound like they are properties distinct from the 
Essence...nonetheless, they are not really properties of the Essence when they are predicated of 
God”.29 This does not mean, Totleben goes on to say, that the different perfections we 
predicate onto God are, at base, synonymous with one another. What this means is that the 
different perfections predicated onto God are distinct - and, in his words, “inadequate” - ways 
of naming the Divine Essence, which is something so vast that it expresses itself through 
different distinct perfections.30 Because of Divine Simplicity, there is no distinction between 
the Divine Essence and the Qualities and Perfections predicated of the Essence. 
 
27 Peter Totleben, O.P., in “The Palamite Controversy: A Thomistic Analysis”, uses such terminology, though the 
idea behind it is not unique to him, but rather is drawn from other Thomistic sources and from Thomas himself. 
 
28 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Q. 13, A. 4 respondeo, pg. 63. 
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Finally, Aquinas argues that existence, in the case of created beings, is to essence what 
act is to potency, in that the concrete existence of a thing is what actualizes the essence. But 
since there is no potency in God, there is no need to frame God’s Existence as something 
distinct from or outside of God’s Essence as something which actualizes It.31 Thus, God is His 
Own Essence, and whatever God is, is fully actualized with no admixture of potency. The 
reason for these claims becomes clearer when one looks at Aquinas’s definition of God: God is 
not a particular being, but rather is ipse essum subsistens (“self-subsistent being” or “being 
subsistent in itself”). What it means for God to be “self-subsistent being” can be found by 
looking at Aquinas’s meditation upon one of God’s titles - Yahweh (“I am”) - in the Summa 
Theologiæ I, Q. 13, A. 11. This name is a proper name of God, Aquinas argues, since “it does 
not signify form, but simply existence”.32  There is no one particular form that defines God; 
rather, God is He Who lays the basis for all other forms. It is for this reason that Aquinas notes 
that this name is, in fact, the most appropriate name for God. The more universal the name, the 
broader, more general, or vaguer it sounds, for it is less connected with specific, concrete 
things and pertains more to realities that transcend the particular. When the mind hears more 
universal terms or titles, it is less likely to think of a specific, concrete reality. Names for God 
that are less universal in nature tend to call to mind images which, due to being more closely 
tied to specific modes of being, less sufficiently describe God. Therefore, since God lays the 
basis for, and as a result transcends, all specific modes of being, no name is more fitting for 
 
31 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I, Q. 3, A. 4, respondeo, pg. 17. 
 




God than that name which is the most universal in nature, that name which implies existence 
without implying a specific mode of existence.33 
Aquinas’s discussion here is reminiscent of, and in many ways builds off of, his 
discussion in the Summa Theologiæ I, Q. 3, A. 5, where Aquinas asks whether God can be 
classified as a part of a genus. Aquinas answers this question in the following maner: “...God is 
the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.”34 God’s 
Being or Essence is not determined by some higher metaphysical principle associated with a 
particular mode of being, nor is God the ontological principle of a specific mode of being; 
rather, God is that which determines all other modes of being. 
God is thus not determined by any reality outside of Himself, but rather is He Who is 
determinative of all created realities. Therefore, since created beings are not determinative of 
their own existences, and, as a result, do not contain the foundation of their existence within 
themselves, everything creation is and has is contingent on a reality more ontologically 
foundational than itself. The various qualities predicated of created beings thus must trace their 
roots back to something outside of itself. Yet this cannot be said of God, being the ontological 
foundation of all of reality outside of Himself. The qualities of creatures - existence, goodness, 
beauty, wisdom, strength - are thus traced back to God as their Source. 
Such a vision of God - one in which God cannot be defined by, and in fact lays the 
basis for, and therefore transcends, any categories or modes of being within creation - can 
easily be paired with a belief in a transcendent God. Yet, the Thomistic view is also one in 




34 Ibid., I Q. 3 A. 5, pg 18. 
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creation. How is such self-communication reconcilable with belief in a transcendent God? 
Aquinas here makes use of a particular theoretical framework put forward by Augustine, 
though it is important to note that Aquinas nuances such a view by infusing it with elements of 
Aristotelian thought. 
Augustine writes in his 187th Letter that God is present in His fullness to of creation. 
This is a metaphysical and theological necessity, since, if God were not present to something, it 
would not exist. Augustine can thus use rather strong language to describe the immanence of 
God. For example, he states that the fullness of God’s Being is present to every part of 
creation, and goes on to describe God as “the very creative substance of the world.” Yet, in 
describing God in such a way, he is not asserting a pantheistic worldview, but rather that God 
is that which creates and sustains the world in its existence. Now, that which creates and 
sustains, and that which is created and sustained, are distinct. God is therefore not a quality of 
the world. God can therefore be present to the world without being a thing within the world.35 
Thus, for Augustine, Divine transcendence and Divine immanence are not contradictory or 
competing concepts, but rather qualify or complement each other. 
 Though Aquinas does not directly quote from this particular work by Augustine, 
Aquinas, over the course of his writings, does articulate a similar view, and in constructing his 
view does directly borrow from Augustine. For Aquinas, like Augustine, God’s Presence 
permeates every part of creation, but this is not seen as contradicting God’s transcendence. 
Aquinas’s thought on the matter can thus be seen as continuing the same train of thought first 
articulated by Augustine, but makes use of certain philosophical and theological concepts, 
 
35 St. Augustine, “Letter 187,” translated by Sister Wilfrid Parsons, S.N.D., from Letters, vol. 4, in The Fathers of 




particularly those borrowed from Aristotelian metaphysics, and in particular Aristotle’s 
understanding of causality, to add a deeper level of nuance to Augustine’s view. In the De 
potentia, Aquinas summarizes a passage from Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram, in which he 
states that “nature cannot exist except through God’s action, for it would fall into nothingness 
were it not preserved in being by the action of the Divine Power.” Aquinas concludes from this 
teaching the following, “Therefore, nature cannot act unless God act also.”36 The larger point 
here is clear: the Divine Power permeates every part of creation, and that such is necessary for 
the created realm to exist; nonetheless, the reality that God is present to His creation does not 
undermine Divine transcendence.  
For Aristotle, causal influence is not just something prior to and surrounding the effect, 
but is at work even within the effect. Thus, Anne Clifford, commenting on the history of the 
Christian view of creation, writes that for Thomas, applying such a view to the Christian 
understanding of creation, God is “conjoined with every being insofar as God is its causal 
source”37. Such a view can be seen in the works of Aquinas himself. More specifically, in De 
potentia, Aquinas writes, “Accordingly Divine Power must needs be present to every acting 
thing…Consequently we may say that God works within everything forasmuch as everything 
needs His Power in order to act...”38 No created reality can exist or operate apart from the 
presence of the causal activity of God. Because the existence and operation of all created 
things is an effect of God’s causal power, God’s causal power is said to be present to and at 
 
36 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, Question III, Article VII, translated by the 
English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, Newman Press, 1952), accessed on 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180531082154/http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/QDdePotentia.htm#3:7. 
 
37 Anne Clifford, “Creation,” in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, edited by Francis Schüssler 
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work in all things; further, because of the doctrine of Divine simplicity - at least as understood 
in the Thomistic tradition - wherever God’s causal power is present, so too is present His 
Essence. Aquinas writes that God “is His own power,” and therefore “wherever the power of 
God is there is His Essence”.39 
Nonetheless, Aquinas does not assert that the Divine Essence is present to creation in 
an unqualified sense. Aquinas writes, “...He [God] is in all things not as a part of their essence 
but as upholding them in their being.”40 That is to say, the presence of God’s causal activity 
within created beings does not imply any identity between God and creation. Aquinas explains 
how this is the case in the following manner: “Everything is therefore called good from the 
Divine Goodness, as from the first exemplary, effective, and final principle of all goodness.”41 
God creates and sustains the existence of good things outside of Himself (that is, things 
capable of imitating His Goodness); further, God, as the Source of all Goodness, is not a 
particular type of goodness, but is That from which the goodness of all other things is derived, 
thereby making God the Standard of goodness in other things; finally, God is that good 
towards which all other goods are oriented, such that in desiring other goods we ultimately 
desire God’s Goodness.  
Thus, for Aquinas, God is the efficient, final and exemplar cause of all things. Note, 
though, that of all the different causes posited in Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, the two 
which Thomas does not apply to God are the formal and the material. If God operates as a 






41 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ I, Q. 6, A. 4, respondeo, pg. 28. 
28 
 
without being considered a thing within creation; God’s act of creation, or the effects thereof, 
can be at work within created realities without them being considered a part of created realities. 
If God were the material cause of creation, then God would, in a sense, be the raw material out 
of which creation was made; if God were the formal cause of creation, then He would be an 
organizational principle within a thing that causes it to be the way it is. All of this would imply 
pantheism. Thomas thus concludes that creation participates in the Perfections of God by virtue 
of having the foundation of its perfections lie not within itself, but within Someone outside of 
itself (namely God) Who through His creational activity brings it into being out of nothing; 
further, creation participates in God by virtue of the fact that in having its perfections derived 
from God, it imitates God to some degree, since God, as the Source of all perfections, is the 
standard by which we measure such things as goodness, existence, virtue, or wisdom; and 
finally, creation participates in God to the extent that the more it develops its own perfections, 
thereby imitating God to ever greater degrees, it is drawn into deeper levels of union with God. 
 Therefore, God is good or exists or is virtuous or wise in a proper sense, insofar as He 
is the Source or Foundation of these things, and these perfections are present in creation insofar 
as God shares them with us, insofar as His causal power is at work within us creating and 
sustaining us. Yet, God’s Goodness, as the Source of all goodness, or His Existence, as the 
Source of all existence, transcends all modes by which goodness, existence, or other 
perfections exist or manifest themselves within creation. God, in creating or sustaining 
creaturely perfections, is creating a being that reflects the Perfections of God in a specific 
manner or to a certain specific (and limited) degree. No created being has goodness, or 
existence, or wisdom, to an infinite degree, nor does any created being have existence as such, 
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or goodness as such, or wisdom as such, but rather a specific mode of existence, goodness or 
wisdom. Creaturely existence and perfections are thus analogous by nature. 
 
Thomistic Anthropology 
 All of creation participates in, and therefore reflects, the Perfections of God. Yet, only 
rational creatures, including humans, attain by grace a level of participation in the Perfections 
of God which would constitute deification. The reason for this is because it is the rational 
creature alone which was created in the image of God. Thus, anthropology is just as important 
an element of any doctrine of deification as an understanding of the broad metaphysical 
relations between God and creation.  
What precisely does it mean for rational creatures to be in the image of God? For 
Aquinas, the solution begins with differentiating the concept of image and that of likeness. A 
likeness is a sharing of certain qualities. The concept of an image, on the other hand, while 
similar to (and, in Aquinas’s view, even presupposing) the concept of likeness, intensifies this 
concept. An image refers specifically to something copying or imitating an exemplar.42 
What is it about the nature of the human person that makes us in the image of God? 
This was hotly debated in the early Church, but one tradition says that the imago Dei rests in 
the rationality of the human person. Origen of Alexandria, writing in the early A.D. 3rd 
century, writes, “For He [God] made our rational nature, which He created ‘in His own image 
and likeness’ (cf. Genesis 1:26), incorruptible, and therefore the soul, which is immortal, is not 
shut out by the shortness of our present life from the Divine healing and remedies.”43 What is 
 
42 Ibid., I, Q. 93, A. 1, respondeo, pg. 466. 
 
43 Origen, On First Principles, Book III, chapter 1, translated by G.W. Butterworth (Notre Dame: Christian 
Classics, 2013), pg. 233. 
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clear in such a viewpoint are three elements of the imago Dei: the immortality of the soul, its 
purity, and rationality. The soul imitates God through its purity, by which it is united to God 
and therefore partakes in the Life of God. Humans pursue purity through right reason. In a 
sense, the imago Dei for Origen is thought of as a state of being rather than a particular part of 
the soul. As Origen writes, humans are torn between contemplating our Divine Archetype, by 
which we are transformed so as to imitate God to a greater degree, and imitating the devil, a 
state defined by being guided by the passions over and against reason.44 
Unfortunately, Origen’s belief that the soul is something torn between reason and the 
passions, when read in light of such passages as On First Principles Book II chapter 2 and On 
First Principles Book I chapter 4, led to certain beliefs among those who claimed to be his 
disciples and ideological successors which the Church later condemned as heretical. For 
example, the late A.D. 4th century monk and spiritual writer Evagrius. Although quite popular 
during his own life (and even for several centuries afterwards, in spite of his condemnation by 
the Second Council of Constantinople), Evagrius suggested that all created beings, prior to the 
Fall, existed in a purely spiritual mode of existence. With the rise of sin, though, humans were 
distanced from God, and therefore experienced a decrease in the presence of Divine Love 
within them. One of the most explicit effects of this decrease in the presence of the Love of 
God was that humanity sank to a lower level of existence and took on a bodily form. The 
purpose of prayer and spiritual growth was to overcome bodily things, to return to that state of 
pure mind or pure spirit from which we fell.45 
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Nonetheless, the general sentiment behind Origen’s thought - namely the close 
association of the imago Dei with reason - would remain an integral part of Church teaching. 
One of Origen’s contemporaries, Clement of Alexandria, wrote similarly in his Exhortation to 
the Heathen, in which he writes that since God, being incorporeal in nature, exists as pure 
Mind, the image of God within the human person must lie in the mind.46 Roughly two 
centuries after the death of Clement, Augustine writes that in Scripture, the title of imago Dei 
is something applied only to humans of all created beings. It must therefore rest with 
something unique to humans. The image of God cannot rest with the body, for humans have 
this in common with all physical beings, nor can it rest with the soul, for this humans have in 
common with all other living beings. It must therefore rest with a specific part of the soul 
unique to humanity, and this is reason.47 
Aquinas uses a similar line of reasoning in his treatment of the image of God in the 
Summa Theologiæ. In one objection, Aquinas’s hypothetical interlocutor notes that Pseudo-
Dionysius asserted that all effects are images of their cause; therefore, since all of creation was 
the result of God’s act of creating, all of creation, not just humanity, is an image of God. 
Aquinas concedes that there is a broader manner of understanding the concept of “image,” one 
that encompasses all of creation. All of creation, insofar as it was created by God, reflects the 
Perfections of God. Yet there is a more specific sense of the term “image” that applies to 
rational creatures alone. The likeness that constitutes an image in this narrower sense, as 
Aquinas says, “requires likeness in species.” It must be more than generic or accidental. More 
 
46 Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Heathen, chapter 10, translated by William Wilson, in The Ante-
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specifically, there are three things that define God: He exists, He is living, and He is rational. 
Only a creature whose specific mode of existence includes all of these qualities can be 
considered an image of God.48  
It is this which gets at the heart of not only the Thomistic understanding of “image” 
more generanlly but also the Thomistic understanding of the imago Dei. There is a point of 
nuance that must be taken into consideration. This “likeness in species” that defines the image 
of God within the rational creature does not mean that God and those creatures that bear His 
image are the same type of being. Rather, for Aquinas there is some fundamental element of 
human nature that reflects, parallels or imitates the fundamental elements of Divine Nature in a 
fuller manner than non-rational creatures. Aquinas asserts that, in the strict sense, Jesus, Who 
is begotten of the Substance of the Father and therefore is consubstantial with Him, is the 
image of God. This concept was affirmed by many thinkers in the tradition of the Church. 
Clement of Alexandria writes that “the image of God is His Word,” and that the human race is 
the “image of the Word”.49 Origen builds on this, noting that in the translation of Genesis 1:26-
27 available to him, it is written that the human race was created “according to the image of 
God,” which implied that the image of God was a principle outside of the human person in 
accordance with which the human person was created. Origen, based on the authority of such 
Biblical texts as Colossians 1:15, Hebrews 1:13, and John 14:9-10, concludes that Jesus is the 
Image of God. Jesus is united to the Father in an intimate manner; this is true to such a degree 
that the Perfections of God shine in and through Christ in such a way that He is the perfect 
reflection of the Father. For humans to be created in the image of God is for us to imitate 
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Christ, to partake in the Son’s likeness to the Father.50 Augustine, in his ninth sermon de 
tempore, writes similarly, comparing the image of the Father found in the Son to that of the 
image of a king found in his son, whereas the image of God found in the human person is 
compared to the image of a king on a coin. Aquinas quotes this sermon directly in the Summa 
Theologiæ I, Q. 93, A. 1, reply to objection 2.51 It is on account of the fact that Aquinas makes 
this distinction that he makes a point of noting that in the translation of Genesis 1:26-27 used 
by him, it is translated “God created man to His image…” The term “to” here is important: it, 
in Aquinas’s words, “represents a certain approach, as if from a distance”52. 
Humans do not share in the same essence as God, yet, through the use of reason, they 
are capable of imitating certain fundamental elements of the Divine Nature. Yet, Aquinas does 
not stop merely with saying that the image of God rests with reason or the intellect alone. 
Aquinas makes use of a strongly Augustinian concept that if God is Triune, so too must the 
image of God within the human person. Augustine puts forward various analogies for the 
Trinity, and in doing so shows how the imago Dei within the rational creature is triune in 
nature. Augustine first suggests the analogy of the mind, thoughts, and love. Thoughts proceed 
from the mind just as the Son is begotten of the Father, and just as the Son is a mirror of the 
Father, so too the mind’s thought of itself is a mirror image of the mind. Now, a lover can only 
love the beloved insofar as the beloved is known by the lover. The mind, insofar as it knows 
itself, is capable of loving itself. Hence, from the relationship between the mind and the mind’s 
thought of itself, the mind’s love of itself comes forth, in a manner analogous to how the Holy 
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Spirit proceeds from the relationship between the Father and the Son. This analogy falls short, 
though, insofar as the mind is the substance from which thoughts and love proceed, whereas 
the Father is not the Substance of God, but rather One of the three Persons in Whom the 
Substance of God subsists.53 Augustine then proposes a variant of this analogy, wherein the 
triune nature of the image of God is associated with three capacities within the mind, namely 
memory, thoughts, and love. Memory, in Augustinian thought, refers not merely to the ability 
of the mind to store information, but also to the more general principle of consciousness within 
the mind, which includes or lays the basis for - but is not ultimately reducible to - the ability to 
store information. Memory or consciousness allows for thoughts, and therefore thoughts 
proceed from memory in a manner similar to how the Son is begotten by the Father. When 
memory turns in on itself, the mind produces a thought of itself, the mind’s thought of itself 
being analogous to how the Son mirrors the Father, being consubstantial with the Father as 
One coming forth from Him. The mind’s love of itself results from the relationship between 
memory and the mind’s understanding of itself that it produces, just as the Holy Spirit comes 
forth from the relationship between the Father and the Son.54 
 An important point to note is that Augustine, later in the De Trinitate, nuances this 
analogy further. Augustine does not identify the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit merely 
with certain capacities in the soul, but rather with the acts that come forth from these 
capacities. Augustine writes, “...[F]rom the moment it [the mind] began to be, it has never 
stopped remembering, understanding, and loving itself, as we have already shown. And 
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therefore when it [the mind] turns to itself by thought, a trinity is formed, in which a word too 
can be perceived. It is formed of course out of the very act of thought itself, with the will 
joining the two together.”55 As we will see in Aquinas’s thought, this nuanced distinction is 
also found: the Son and the Holy Spirit are not associated merely with the capacity for thought 
or love, but with the act of knowing and loving itself. 
In his treatment of the image of God, Aquinas writes, “Likewise as the Uncreated 
Trinity is distinguished by the Procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from 
both of these, so we may say in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in 
the intellect, and the procession of love in the will, there exists an image of the Uncreated 
Trinity, by a certain representation of the species.”56 This presupposes a comprehension of the 
Thomistic vision of the Trinity. Aquinas notes that there are “two processions in God, one by 
way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, 
which is the procession of Love…”57 Concerning the first procession within the Trinity, 
Aquinas states that the term “word” can have a multiplicity of meanings. The three relevant to 
this discussion refer to, firstly, the movement of the mind from a state of ignorance to a state of 
understanding; secondly, it may refer to the thought, idea, or mental image conceived of in the 
mind as a result of this metal movement; thirdly, it may refer to a sound produced in a physical 
sense by which we give expression to thoughts and ideas. The Son is the Word of God in the 
second sense of the term “word”58 Now, the term “word” may be taken either in an essential or 
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in a personal sense. It is taken in an essential sense when it applies to God’s act of 
understanding, but it is taken in a personal sense when interpreted to refer to the Son, since in 
this sense it refers to “that which emanates from another,” namely in this case the Divine 
Mind.59 When the Divine Intellect turns in on Itself, and therefore the Father knows Himself 
perfectly, that which emanates from the Divine Mind in the Father’s act of understanding 
Himself is the Son, the Word. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is the Love shared between the Father 
and the Son; yet, this Love - like with the concept of the Word - is taken personally and not 
essentially, that is, it refers not merely to the ability to love, but to the actual love itself shared 
between the Father and the Son.60 
With this in mind we can now better understand how Aquinas viewed the Triune nature 
of God being reflected in the image of God. The rational faculty within the mind produces a 
mental word, and when the intellectual faculty turns in on itself, it produces a thought of itself 
analogous to what happens when the Father begets the Son. When the mind comprehends 
itself, it comprehends its own goodness, and therefore loves itself; the mind’s love of itself 
therefore is something born out of the relationship between the mind’s ability to know and its 
thought of itself, in a manner analogous to how the Holy Spirit proceeds from the relationship 
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Grace and Deification, and the Elevation of the  
Image of God 
 Such an understanding of human nature leads to Aquinas’s conclusion: “Now the 
intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself”.61 To 
know the good - to comprehend it on a rational level, that is, to do more than simply be aware 
of the existence or presence of some good, to desire it on the level of instinct, but rather to 
comprehend what makes something good, and therefore to have some understanding of the 
concept of goodness itself - and to love it, is what defines creatures made in God’s image. The 
fulfillment of this image is to direct this capacity to know and to love towards the Highest 
Good, God. Aquinas further specifies that the image of God is perfected in the ability to know 
God and love God perfectly, which is possible only in the glorified state in heaven.  
 Yet, God is a supernatural reality, that is, a reality that transcends the created realm. 
Human nature is thus fundamentally oriented towards a good that transcends its ability to 
obtain. How can a finite reality such as the human will truly love an infinite Being such as 
God? How can a finite reality such as the human mind truly comprehend a transcendent 
Object? Therefore, an inevitable result of anthropology is soteriology, and more specifically 
the doctrine of grace. 
 Aquinas has a very specific, threefold definition of grace. Firstly, grace refers to a sense 
of love or favor shown by one person towards another; secondly, it refers to something which 
someone does or gives to another as a result of this sense of love or favor; finally, it refers to a 
sense of gratitude on the part of the receiver of these gifts. Grace in the first sense implies 
 




something within God alone; grace in the latter two senses implies something within the soul 
of the one who receives God’s love or favor.62  
 God loves His creation, and expresses His love through the various gifts He bestows on 
them. This love is different than created love. Love is the desire for some good. Yet, the love 
that creatures show towards their object presupposes the existence of some good in the object 
of our love. A thing is good prior to or independent of our love of it, and we love it only after 
recognizing its goodness. But for God to desire the good of creation does not mean that God 
desires some pre-existent good in creation; rather, God, in willing the good of creation, brings 
about that good which He desires for creation. Aquinas articulates this fact in the following 
manner: “...[S]ince the creature’s good springs from the Divine Will, some good in the creature 
flows from God’s love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature”63. Yet, Aquinas makes a 
further distinction: grace refers not merely to God’s love or the gifts He bestows more 
generally. As Aquinas writes, “...[A]ccording to this difference of good the love of God to the 
creature is looked at differently. For one is common, whereby He loves ‘all things that are’ 
(Wisdom 11:25), and thereby gives their natural being. But the second is a special love, 
whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of 
the Divine good…”64 That is to say, there is a difference between God willing some natural 
good for creation, and God desiring for His creation the supernatural good of union with 
Himself. Existence, health, wealth, intelligence, various talents and skills are all goods 
pertaining to the created realm; yet, God, as the creator of all things, transcends the created 
 







realm, and therefore union with God also transcends the created realm. As a result, those gifts 
that directly pertain to our salvation are of a higher order than those gifts that pertain to this 
world. The love whereby God gives us those gifts pertaining to our salvation is of a higher 
order than that common love whereby God loves all of creation. 
 It is important to note here that contained within the Thomistic definition of grace is a 
distinction that would go on to become important to the Thomistic view, and to a great degree 
the Catholic view of grace more generally, namely the distinction between created and 
uncreated grace. In the Summa Theologiæ I-II, Q. 110, A. 1, Aquinas asks, “Does grace imply 
anything within the soul?” The answer (as stated in the previous paragraph) was that grace 
could refer to a sense of love or favor on the part of God towards His creatures, but could also 
refer to the gifts that God gives on account of this love or favor. (Aquinas, again, also notes 
that the Latin term for grace - gratia - could refer not only to a gift given, but also to a sense of 
gratitude within the recipient on account of receiving such a gift.) Thus, Aquinas sees the term 
“grace” as referring both to something within God as well as something within the human soul; 
it refers to God’s love, mercy, or favor as well as the effects of that love or favor within the 
human person. Various Catholic theologians, particularly in the West, built on this definition to 
make a distinction between what is called “uncreated grace” and “created grace”: God’s love 
or favor is an uncreated reality, whereas the effects of this love or favor are a created reality; 
nonetheless, insofar as the term gratia could refer to both a sense of love or favor as well as to 
a gift given, both could rightfully be considered grace. Garrigou-Lagrange, in his commentary 
on Aquinas’s treatment of grace, repeats this threefold definition of grace put forward by 
Aquinas, and explicitly refers to the latter two definitions of grace as a “created grace.” He 
further goes on to specify that there are two types of created grace: those external to the soul 
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(such as the preaching of the Gospel or the example of Christ), and those internal to the soul 
(that whereby the soul is sanctified, or the charismatic gifts).65 Charles Journet writes similarly, 
saying, “The uncreated divine grace, the uncreated Divine favor, causes in us created graces, 
created gifts and benefits, for which we render acts of thanksgiving.”66 In a word, the 
dispositions within the human soul infused into the soul by grace are a reality created by God.  
 Daria Spezzano, commenting on the Thomistic view on deification, notes that God, in 
His grace, transforms or renews the human person. The infused virtues therefore become actual 
inherent qualities of the graced soul. The Divine Love, Favor or Mercy is itself an uncreated 
reality, but this Love, Favor or Mercy causes within man the infused virtues. The attempt on 
the part of some theologians to undermine the distinction between created and uncreated grace 
in the thought of Aquinas, mainly for ecumenical purposes (i.e., the attempt to bridge the gap 
between Eastern and Western Christian thought), undermines the reality that deification is a 
participated likeness on the part of the creature in the Perfections of God, God making the 
created being a sharer or partaker in the things of the Divine.67 
 Thus, for Thomas, there are certain expressions of the Divine Love that purify and 
elevate the human condition. Most importantly for the Thomistic view of grace, understood in 
such terms, is the fact that he describes the final end or purpose of the giving of grace as the 
human person being made a partaker in the things of God. Aquinas describes this supernatural 
end as God “drawing the rational creature above its natural condition.” Here we see an almost 
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paradoxical concept: union with God includes the human person knowing and loving God as 
God knows and loves Himself, and, in knowing and loving Himself, knowing and loving His 
creation. This end is, again, supernatural, that is, it transcends the created realm. The rational 
creature would be rendered incapable of this supernatural elevation were it not for the fact that 
it had a rational nature, for the rational creature alone has an intellect and a will, and therefore 
the capacity to know and to love. Yet, natural faculties can only be ordered towards natural 
ends. What this means is that the human desire to know can only be satisfied in God; the same 
is true with the human desire for goodness (something part and parcel of the Thomistic 
definition of love). Human existence is thus oriented towards an end that transcends the 
proportion of its nature. Bernard Lonergan, commenting on the thought of Aquinas, 
summarizes this paradoxical view: the human mind desires to know the sum total of all of 
reality, which includes a knowledge of God; and, more precisely, it is in God that the human 
desire for knowledge is fulfilled.68 Now, while there are some truths about God which the 
human mind can understand by its own power, there are others which transcend the capacity of 
the human mind to understand. Lonergan’s understanding is summarized by J. Michael 
Stebbins in the following manner: “Consequently, although by the natural powers of the 
intellect one can attain the concepts of God as the cause of being, as one, as perfect, as good, 
etc., there is no naturally attainable concept of God ut in se est.”69 The human mind can know 
that God exists, and can comprehend some of the qualities of God, but can never directly 
comprehend God as He is in Himself. The human person thus has “a natural desire to know 
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God,” which is ultimately a desire to attain “a concept of God ut in se est,” yet such a 
knowledge can only be attained “through the light of Glory in the beatific vision”.70 
 Lonergan believed that the human person had, by nature, a desire for a type of 
knowledge which they could not attain by their own powers. Lonergan and his ideological 
heirs represent but one, very specific strand of Thomism, one voice or set of voices among 
many within the Thomist tradition. In particular, in the middle of the twentieth century, one 
hotly debated theological question was how one can affirm that the human person has a natural 
desire to see God: what was at stake was that if the human person had no natural desire to see 
God, this would seem to deny that human nature is fundamentally ordered towards the end of 
union with God; yet, if the human person did have an inherent or natural desire to see God, this 
would seem to undermine the supernatural and grace-infused nature of faith and the beatific 
vision. Lonergan’s solution, one that he shared with other Scholastics of his time - that of the 
obediential potency - was just one of many.71 The merits of his answer, or how consistent it is 
with the original thought of Thomas and the other Medieval Scholastics, are not what is being 
analyzed. The important point to keep in mind is how Lonergan articulates the paradox of 
Thomistic soteriology: that human nature is, by definition, ordered towards an end which it 
cannot bring about by its own nature. 
 One view within 20th century Neo-Scholasticism that was contemporaneous with that 
of Lonergan is the thought of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, who, in his commentary on 
Aquinas’s treatise on grace, writes the following concerning Question 109, Article 2 in 








or sinners are sins...2. It is of faith that supernatural good cannot be effected by fallen man 
without grace.”72 The fact that the human race is fallen does not do away with its ability to do 
good on a natural level; nonetheless, the human race, after the fall, is deprived of grace, and 
therefore lacks the capacity for supernatural acts of goodness, whereby we order our lives 
towards the end of union with God. 
 What has remained consistent within the Thomistic tradition throughout the past eight 
centuries is the notion that there is a certain knowledge and a certain type of moral striving 
which is impossible for man apart from grace; but this supernatural knowledge and 
supernatural virtue is intimately tied with our final end. Human nature thus cannot bring about 
its own fulfillment. As Aquinas writes: 
 
I answer that, imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be 
acquired by man by his natural powers...But man’s perfect happiness, as 
stated above, consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of 
God’s Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but of every 
creature…73 
 
Human nature is oriented towards a specific end, it exists for a specific purpose, and it is in the 
attaining of this end that the human person experiences true happiness and fulfillment. Yet the 
end proper to human nature cannot be fulfilled by any capacity or power within human nature. 
And this is what defines grace: grace is that which elevates and transforms human nature, that 
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which takes what defines human nature - our capacity to know and to love - and orders it 
towards the supernatural end of union with God. Aquinas can therefore, on the basis of this, 
conclude that grace, and the growth in wisdom and holiness that it brings about, can be defined 
in terms of a participation in the Divine Nature. The infused virtues, which are granted to us by 
grace, “dispose man...towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to a higher nature, i.e., 
in relation to a participation in the Divine Nature.”74 
 We see this with regard to the assent of faith. In the Thomistic understanding, every act 
of comprehension is a movement of the mind from potency to act. Certain truths can be 
understood by the mind by its own power, including certain truths about God, such as that He 
exists or that He is One. Other truths about God, such as the Trinity, cannot be known by 
reason. God must therefore move the mind in a manner that goes beyond its natural capacity, 
so that it can comprehend a higher set of truths. God by His grace moving the human mind in 
such a way that it can comprehend a higher set of truths that go beyond its normal capacity to 
understand is identified by Aquinas with the light of faith.75 
 Aquinas makes a similar argument with regard to the moral life more generally. 
Aquinas makes a distinction between the natural virtues and the supernatural (or theological) 
virtues. The natural virtues stem from the capacity for goodness inherent to or resulting from 
human nature as such. The natural moral capacities inherent to the human person allow the 
human person to attain certain goods within the created realm, but do not allow man to strive 
towards goods that transcend the created realm. Aquinas articulates this truth in the following 
terms: “...[M]an by his natural endowments could wish or do the good proportionate to his 
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nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, such as the good of 
infused virtue.”76 In order for man to order or arrange his life towards the supernatural end of 
union with God, it is necessary for there to be a moral capacity added to the human soul which 
transcends our natural moral capacity. Such are the theological virtues of faith, hope and 
charity, which the human person does not and cannot obtain by its own moral striving (though 
it is possible to deepen or harness these virtues once they are granted by God); rather, the fact 
that the soul has the ability to exhibit these virtues is a result of Divine grace infusing them into 
the soul. It is for this reason that Aquinas also states that it is impossible for the human person 
to merit eternal life apart from grace, for no natural capacity can merit a supernatural end.77 
Grace is necessary not only for the elevating of human nature, but also for its healing. As a 
result of the Fall, humanity not only lost grace, but saw the corrupting of its nature. The 
corruption of human nature weakened or limited the human capacity to pursue the natural 
virtues. Grace is thus necessary for both the healing or renewing of the natural moral capacities 
of the human person as well as the infusing of the supernatural or theological virtues.78 
 None of this implies that human nature lacks any ability to love or desire the 
supernatural. Since the human person has a natural capacity to know that God exists, and that 
God is the Source or Creator of all things, we can comprehend God as the Highest Good; we 
can also comprehend that a thing is deserving of love to the extent that it is good; therefore, 
humanity, by its own power, can love God as the Highest Good. Yet, apart from grace, it is 
impossible for man to love God “as the giver of beatitude” within the context of “fellowship 
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with God”.79 For humans to recognize that God and God alone is the provider of true happiness 
and ultimate fulfillment, and further, that this happiness from God is possible only within the 
context of friendship with God, is possible only as a result of grace. Thus, it is not the act of 
loving or knowing God, in and of itself, that is infused into the soul, but the mode by which we 
know or love. 
 This is the leitmotif of Thomistic soteriology: partly because of the finite nature of the 
human person, and partly because of human sinfulness and the alienation from God this causes, 
fellowship with God is naturally impossible. But, based on the authority of 1 Corinthians 1:9 - 
“God is faithful, and by Him you were called to fellowship with His Son, Jesus Christ our 
Lord” - this is exactly what is established by grace: a created reality can enter into union with 
an Uncreated Reality, with the Source of all reality. This union has a strong moral element to 
it, for it includes specifically the nature of friendship. Aquinas identifies friendship as a species 
of love rooted in benevolence and mutuality. God, out of a sense of love for the human race, 
communicates Himself to the human person through grace, which enables the recipient of His 
grace to reciprocate this love. Grace bestows onto the soul charity, and charity establishes 
friendship between God and humanity. Friendship between us and God is thus rooted in the 
self-communication of God to humanity - which is the cause of the perfecting of the image of 
God within the human person.80 Grace, and especially the gift of charity it bestows, is also 
identified by Aquinas as that whereby humankind is deified. Aquinas articulates the link 
between grace and deification in the following manner: “...[G]race is nothing else than a 
participated likeness of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Peter 1:4, ‘He hath given us most 
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great and precious promises; that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature.’”81 For Aquinas, 
to the extent that a thing participates in the Divine Nature, it is united to the Divine Nature, and 
to the extent that creatures participate in (and are therefore united to) the Divine Nature, they 
are likened to It. The spiritual life is therefore a process of increasing our likeness to God. Such 
a point is emphasized in Spezzano’s commentary on the Thomistic understanding of 
deification: the spiritual life, in Thomistic thought, is a process of “progression in the 
perfection of the Divine image” which “culminates in deiformity.”82 Spezzano further writes, 
“The rational creature predestined for eternal life is on a journey of transformation toward the 
beatific vision, which takes place by increasing participation in the Divine likeness, beginning 
from its creation with a nature that shares in the light of the Divine intellect.”83 That is to say, 
human nature is oriented towards the end of the beatific vision. While striving towards this 
end, the image of God within the human person becomes more and more perfect, until it finally 
reaches perfect likeness to God. In this, God perfects what is started in creation: humans, by 
virtue of what they are as creatures created in the imago Dei, imitate and participate in the 
Divine Nature in a manner that surpasses that of non-rational creatures. In the glorified state 
(which is the culmination of deification), the human person is united to God in such a manner 
that it shares in the Divine Nature to a greater degree than it does now. Even though such a 
participation presupposes a rational nature capable of knowing and loving God, the 
actualization of such an end is something brought about by grace.  
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Garrigou-Lagrange expounds this point more explicitly: “In the natural order, a stone 
has an analogical likeness to God inasmuch as He is being, the plant inasmuch as He is living, 
man and angel inasmuch as He is intelligence. Sanctifying grace, which is far superior to the 
angelic nature, is an analogical likeness to God inasmuch as He is God, or to His Deity, to His 
intimate life…”84 Garrigou-Lagrange notes that one could respond to such a vision of 
deification by saying that if such a state was innate to the human person, then this would imply 
an indefinite number of hypostases added to the Trinity, for we would be partaking in the 
Divine Essence in the same manner that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit do. Yet, he further 
notes that in Thomistic theology, deification goes hand-in-hand with the notion of adopted 
sonship. Created existence results from the communication of Divine Goodness and the other 
Perfections of God; likewise, in Thomistic theology, adopted sonship results from humanity, 
by grace, having a share in the Sonship of Jesus. The Glory which Jesus has by virtue of being 
the Only-Begotten Son humanity partakes in, because humanity is united to and conformed to 
Christ. This union with and conformity to Christ is something caused by the Father, Who 
accomplishes it through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Through grace, humanity is 
conformed to the Sonship of Christ. A major difference is that the Sonship of Christ is caused 
by the Father as a Cause consubstantial with the effect; God causes us to be sons of God and 
partakers in the Divine as an efficient and material cause, but as a cause which still infinitely 
transcends, and therefore can never be consubstantial with, creation.85 
What is more, not only is man perfectly united and conformed to God, but deification 
also presupposes an element of friendship as well. The deified soul is conformed to God in the 
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act of knowing and loving God. Yet, it is in knowing and loving the other that we enter into 
friendship with God. Grace, in bestowing onto the soul the capacity to know and love God, 
also established friendship between us and Himself. Through friendship with God, we receive 
the Love of God in such a way that the human person, under the influence of this Love, is 
enabled to imitate and reciprocate this Love to the greatest extent that a created being is 
capable. Hand-in-hand with the love of God is a knowledge of God, for love is impossible 
without a knowledge of the object of our love. Thus, friendship with God also includes a 
perfection of our knowledge and charity. The more we grow in the love and knowledge of 
God, the more we grow in the other moral and spiritual perfections. It is this which is central to 
the Thomistic understanding of deification. 
Finally, the vision of deification as including a union with God, a union whereby the 
deified soul attains a perfect likeness to God and therefore an increased participation in the 
Perfections of God, also leads to the final major element of deification in Thomistic thought: 
namely, the notion of deification as including adopted sonship. As Aquinas notes, when one 
adopts another as a son or daughter, they “admit...him as heir of his estate.” Since God is good, 
it makes sense that He would give us His blessings, thereby making us a partaker of good 
things. Now, God gives special blessings to the rational soul, namely those associated with 
eternal salvation, since rational creatures are “made to the image of God, [and therefore] are 
capable of Divine beatitude.” By creating us in such a way so that we are capable of Divine 
beatitude, and by drawing us back to such an end after we had fallen, God makes us partakers 
of His estate, that is, partakers of the things unique to God, namely the enjoyment of the 
Goodness of God.86 There is a strong Christological element to this as well: Jesus, as the Only-
 




Begotten Son of God, is the heir to the Kingdom of the Father. By becoming human, Jesus 
unites the things of God and the things of creation. By grace, we are united to and conformed 
to Jesus, and thus, Thomas, based on the words of Romans 8:17 and Romans 8:29, can claim 


























THE PALAMITE UNDERSTANDING OF DEIFICATION 
 Now that we have analyzed the thought of one of the giants of the Medieval Latin 
tradition, we turn to a thinker of similar stature from the same period of the Greek tradition, 
namely Gregory Palamas. One major theme in Gregory Palamas’s theology was the Essence-
Energies distinction. Originally formulated within the context of a very specific debate - 
namely on how to reconcile the transcendence and immanence of God - the Essence-Energies 
distinction came to bear greatly not only on the Palamite vision of God and His relation to 
creation, but also his view of grace, mysticism, and, ultimately deification. This creates a very 
specific vision of how man is deified. The Palamite vision therefore differs greatly from that of 
the Thomistic vision, and the points they do have in common are articulated in different 
manners, as they are nested within the context of different metaphysical and theological 
systems. 
 
Palamas, Participation, and 
the Essence-Energies Distinction 
 We now proceed to our analysis of Gregory Palamas. A near contemporary of Aquinas, 
born a mere 22 years after Aquinas’s death, Palamas occupies a stature within the Byzantine 
tradition of similar import to that of Aquinas within the Latin tradition. One key difference, 
though, was that Palamas, in spite of his status as a man of noble origins, and the fact that he 
received one of the best educations available to one in the late Byzantine period, was not 
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primarily a scholar or a preacher. Aquinas, being both a professor at the University of Paris and 
a member of a religious order which had as its charism preaching (and the founding of which 
was inspired by the desire to counteract various heresies which were emerging throughout 
Europe during the Medieval period), dedicated most of his career to responding to various 
heresies, both past and present, and synthesizing the various sources of Christian doctrine into 
a singular, overarching system of thought. Palamas did the same for his tradition, but his 
motives were different. Palamas was inspired by a series of very specific theological debates 
the extent of which rattled the very foundations of the Byzantine church. Palamas was brought 
into these debates quite unintentionally, not as a result of some larger ecclesial, pastoral or 
academic project. 
After abandoning the aristocratic life at the age of 20 to pursue the monastic life, 
Palamas spent most of his early career as a monk on Mount Athos, and later a hermit (with his 
monastic life being only temporarily interrupted by the Turkish invasion of Mount Athos, 
during which time Palamas and some of his fellow monks fled to establish a monastic 
community in northern Greece). Yet Palamas was forced into the arena of public theological 
discourse as a result of certain theological controversies which had been developing under the 
surface for quite some time. During the Fourth Crusade in the 13th century and the subsequent 
establishment of the Empire of Constantinople by the Latins, Catholic missionaries were sent 
to the territories once ruled by the Byzantine Empire. These missionary activities were led in 
particular by the Dominicans, who established two provinces for the Dominican order, one in 
Greece, the other in Jerusalem. In 1261, the Latin ruler Baldwin II was overthrown and the 
Byzantine Empire was reestablished. Yet, starting roughly three quarters of a century later, 
there emerged an increased political amiability between the Byzantine Empire and various 
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Western European powers, as well as an increased interest within the Byzantine church in 
restoring union with Rome. This resulted in Pope John XXII consecrating two Dominican 
friars - Francesco de Camerino and Richard of England - to the status of bishop with the task of 
meeting with the Byzantine Emperor and negotiating a union between the Latin and Byzantine 
churches. In 1334, Francesco and Richard appeared before John Kalakas, the Patriarch of 
Constantinople, and presented him with a text defending the use of the filioque clause in the 
Latin translation of the Creed. Yet, such texts were rejected by the Orthodox, who did not see 
their rejection of the filioque as something open to debate.88 
In response to Franceso and Richard, the Italian-born Constantinopolitan monk and 
professor Barlaam of Calabria delivered a lecture against the use of the filioque, and shortly 
thereafter wrote a series of treatises against what he saw as the various heresies of the West. In 
this latter work - titled simply Anti-Latin Treatises - Barlaam used fairly standard theological 
argumentation, stating an opinion, followed by a series of quotes from various Biblical, 
Patristic, and Magisterial sources in support of his position. Yet, in his fifth treatise, Barlaam 
used a more philosophical approach, attempting to demonstrate his position through a series of 
deductive arguments. In the year following the publication of this text, Palamas - who at the 
time was still living as a monk - received a copy of the fifth treatise, and became disconcerted 
by the epistemology he saw as implicit to Barlaam’s works. Even though some scholars assert 
that Palamas was responding to an oversimplified version Barlaam’s arguments, taking them 
out of their original context, the parameters of the debate quickly became framed in very 
specific terms: Barlaam’s theology came to be presented as rooted in a vision in which Divine 
Revelation was seen as a series of Divinely revealed premises from which we draw certain 
 
88 John Meyendorff, “Introduction,” in The Triads, by Gregory Palamas (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1983), pg. 5-6; 
Peter Totleben, “The Palamite Controversy: A Thomistic Analysis,” pg. 25-26 
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conclusions. The larger epistemic framework was that to demonstrate a claim was to show its 
rational coherence via a process of logical deduction, and knowledge was to assent to such a 
rationally coherent statement. Palamas, on the other hand, saw the demonstration of a point as 
something that included absolute certainty, and knowledge as - in the words of Peter Totleben - 
“an intuitive grasp” of a particular reality.  Palamas thus believed that it was necessary to 
balance the logical with the experiential, believing that the direct encounter with God was 
central to the Christian life.89  
Such a view was in turn rooted in the context of Palamas’s spiritual formation: 
Palamas’s spirituality was shaped by the hesychastic method of prayer. The hesychastic 
method of prayer traces its roots to the teachings of various spiritual writers from the Patristic 
and early Medieval period, and which was undergoing a period of renewed popularity among 
the various monastic circles of Mount Athos (though the monks who practiced this method of 
prayer were known for their missionary mindset, promoting this method of prayer beyond the 
confines of the monastery, so much so that it became popular even within the urban centers of 
the Byzantine world). In the hesychast method of prayer, one would focus on their breathing as 
a way to sharpen their concentration and get rid of any distracting or even sinful thoughts. 
While doing so, they would continually recite various short prayers, including and especially 
the Jesus Prayer, which were meant to direct the focus of one’s mind towards God. Some of the 
monks who practiced this form of prayer claimed to have experienced the presence of God in 
their lives in a particularly immanent manner, seeing the Glory of God appear to them in a 
bright light. Barlaam, in his debates with Palamas, began to investigate his opponent’s spiritual 
formation, including the various spiritual influences on his thought; in doing so, he discovered 
 




this method of prayer, and accused the proponents of hesychasm of being supporters of 
Messalianism. This late Antique heresy, of which we know very little today, claimed, among 
other things, that it was possible to physically perceive the Essence of God with the bodily 
eyes90.  
Thus, what started off as a debate on epistemology and theological methodology 
quickly evolved into a debate over the validity and orthodoxy of hesychasm. Palamas, while 
never claiming to defend the specific mystical experiences of specific monks who took part in 
this form of prayer, nor claiming to have ever had these mystical experiences himself, sought 
rather to create an intellectual framework within which to show that the hesychastic method of 
prayer was not theologically problematic as its opponents claimed. In particular, Palamas 
wanted to demonstrate how it was possible for the human person to have an intimate 
experience of God - in the sense of the mind being able to directly perceive the Light of God’s 
Glory, however faintly - while also affirming the transcendence of God. He did so through the 
Essence-Energies distinction. This doctrine states that the Essence of God is ontologically 
distinct from the Energies of God (that is, His operations or actions); the Essence and the 
Energies of God represent two distinct parts of God’s Existence. The Energies of God are what 
allows a transcendent God to interact with His creation. 
What we see in this doctrine is a particular expression of a larger train of thought: there 
are certain things that can be said of God, but God, when considered in Himself, infinitely 
transcends anything that can be said of Him. In the quote from Maximos mentioned in chapter 
2.1 of this paper, it is stated that God transcends even the notion of substance itself, even the 
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notion of infinite or unbounded substance. To think of God in terms of anything found in the 
created realm, even as an infinite or unbounded version of that thing, is to limit God somehow. 
Maximos himself states this in a very direct manner: the virtues are “qualities appertaining 
essentially to God”91, and yet “God infinitely transcends these participable virtues an infinite 
number of times”.92  As with Aquinas in the West, Maximos sees the virtues as predicated onto 
God in a proper sense; nonetheless, the core of God’s Being infinitely transcends even the 
concept of virtue. Such a view has been passed down in the liturgical tradition of the Byzantine 
church: in the Anaphora of John Chrysostom, the priest says, “…for Thou art God ineffable, 
inconceivable, invisible, incomprehensible, ever existing and eternally the same…”93 
None of this implies, for those within the Byzantine tradition, that theological 
discussions about God are frivolous or impossible. The larger view is that God is so utterly 
transcendent that any way of describing or speaking of God, however accurate or true, is by 
definition insufficient. This, though, seems to negate the closeness of God or the ability of God 
to manifest Himself to His creation. Pseudo-Dionysius writes,  
 
In the Scriptures the Deity has benevolently taught us that understanding 
and direct contemplation of Itself is inaccessible to beings, since it 
surpasses being. Many of the Scripture writers tell us that the Divinity is 
not only invisible [cf. Colossians 1:15, 1 Timothy 1:17, Hebrews 11:27], 
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but also ‘unsearchable and inscrutable’ [cf. Romans 11:33]...And yet, on 
the other hand, the Good is not incommunicable to everything.94 
 
God is so utterly transcendent that He is beyond even the concept of being itself, and is 
therefore in Himself incomprehensible to His creation. The French scholar H.-F. Dondaine 
describes the Dionysian view in the following manner: “The entire work of Dionysius 
forcefully inculcates the absolute transcendence of God. In its super-essential essence, beyond 
light and darkness, beyond being, God is unknowable; it would be folly for the creature to 
aspire to the secrets of God.”95 Nonetheless, Divine transcendence does not render God 
incommunicable to His creatures. What Divine transcendence rules out is the possibility of the 
creature comprehending God or ascending to God by its own power; it does not rule out the 
possibility of God manifesting Himself to His creation. 
 There are thus two general trends that define Byzantine spirituality and theology in this 
area: 1) a very high view of Divine transcendence, which in turn led to the belief that the 
Essence of God infinitely transcends anything predicated of Him; 2) the belief that such a high 
view of Divine transcendence is not in any way in conflict with  the belief that God can and 
does communicate Himself to His creation. These theological tendencies undergird Palamas’s 
defense of hesychasm, and are expressed particularly in his doctrine of the Essence-Energies 
distinction. 
 
94 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names I.2, in The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), translated 
by Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, pg. 50. 
 
95 H.-F. Dondaine, “L’objet et le ‘medium’ de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII e siècle," in 
Researches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, vol. 19 (January-June 1952), pg. 63. 
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 In order to understand the Essence-Energies distinction, we must first define the 
relevant terminology. The essence of a thing is what a thing is. The term “energy” is derived 
from the Greek term energeia, meaning “action” or “operation.” The energy of a thing refers to 
the operations unique to a particular essence, though what Palamas says about the operations of 
God he says also about the Qualities or Perfections of God more generally. For example, 
Palamas writes in his Capita 150, “The Supreme Intellect, the uttermost Good, the Nature 
which transcends life and divinity, being entirely incapable of admitting opposites in any way, 
clearly possesses goodness not as a quality but as essence. … [T]he Supreme Intellect both is 
that good and surpasses goodness.”96 God can never be anything other than good, since God is 
not one specific type of good, but rather is the Source of goodness. Goodness is therefore 
something which God is definitionally, essentially, and formally. Nonetheless, the Divine 
Essence transcends even the concept of goodness, as He transcends anything predicated of 
Him. Totleben notes that this is the major difference between Thomistic and Palamite thought: 
whereas for Thomas the Qualities or Perfections of God are different ways of describing the 
Divine Essence, for Palamas there is a difference between that which is predicated and The 
One on Whom we predicate it.97  
 Palamas, in a word, believed that there was a real ontological distinction between the 
Essence of God and the Energies originating from or the Qualities associated with It. Palamas 
says as much in Book III of the Triads: “Nonetheless, there is only one unoriginate Essence, 
the Essence of God; none of the Powers that inhere in it is an essence, so that all necessarily 
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and always are in the Essence.”98 (emphasis added). The Energies of God are in a sense 
contained within the Essence; yet, that which contains and that which is contained are distinct. 
The 20th century theologian Georges Florovksy argues that one of the reasons why this is the 
case is that Palamas sees a distinction between being and acting. He writes: “These two 
dimensions, that of being and that of acting, are different, and must be clearly distinguished. Of 
course, this distinction in no way compromises the ‘Divine simplicity.’ Yet this is a real 
distinction, and not just a logical device.”99 Being and acting represent two elements of 
existence that are, in a real ontological sense, distinct. The difference is not merely a 
conceptual or logical one. 
 Florovsky briefly alludes to a point which is also pivotal to the Palamite position, but 
which has also been the source of much controversy. In spite of the fact that Palamas believes 
that there is a real distinction within God between His Essence and His Energies, he also 
affirmed the doctrine of Divine simplicity, and did not see the doctrine of Divine simplicity 
and the Essence-Energies distinction as being in any way contradictory. In order to understand 
this point, we must first understand another nuanced element of Gregory’s thought: Palamas 
did not accept what some theologians and commentators have called “absolute Divine 
simplicity,” that is, that there are no distinctions within God at all. Palamas is a realist: he 
believes that anything that implies a distinction has an extra-mental correlate. Goodness, 
omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and all of the other Actions and Perfections of God 
are therefore truly distinct. Yet, Palamas believes that the Essence of God is simple, that is, 
without parts. If the Essence of God is truly simple, it must be distinct from the Perfections and 
 
98 Palamas, The Triads III.2.5, pg. 93. 
 
99 Georges Florovsky, “St. Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers,” in The Collected Works of Georges 
Florovsky, vol. 1 (Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View), pg. 119. 
60 
 
Energies of God, for if the Essence of God is not distinct from the Energies of God, and the 
Energies of God are plural, this would introduce distinctions into the Divine Essence. As 
Palamas expresses it: 
 
But since God is entirely present in each of the Divine Energies, we name 
Him from each of them, although it is clear that He transcends all of them. 
For, given the multitude of Divine Energies, how could God subsist 
entirely in each without any division at all; and how could each provide 
Him with a name and manifest Him entirely, thanks to indivisible and 
supernatural simplicity, if He did not transcend all these Energies?100 
 
For Palamas, God is present in each of the Divine Energies as things proper to His being. Yet, 
God (or, more specifically, His Essence) cannot be reduced to His Energies; otherwise, if the 
Divine Essence was reducible to His Energies, there would be distinctions within the Divine 
Essence, which Palamas sees as running counter to the Christian conception of God. 
Amidst the various theological and philosophical reasons for affirming the Essence-
Energies distinction, the one most central to Palamas’s thought, and most relevant to his 
defense of hesychasm, was to balance Divine transcendence and Divine immanence, to find a 
way to make sense of how a transcendent God can be near to His creation. The Divine Essence 
is transcendent, which implies that it is incomprehensible and, further, that it is beyond all 
contact with creation. Yet Scripture makes it clear that God does in fact directly interact with 
and make Himself known to His creation. If the Divine Essence is transcendent, there must be 
 
100 Palamas, Triads, III.2.7, pg. 95-96. 
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some aspect of God’s Existence distinct from the Essence whereby God interacts with His 
creation. Such are the Divine Energies. Since the Divine Energies are rooted in or come forth 
from the Essence of God, they are truly Divine, and therefore when encountering the Divine 
Energies we are truly encountering God; yet, since the Divine Energies are distinct from the 
Essence, there is no necessity that they be transcendent in nature. 
Such a view is implicit in Palamas’s treatment of God’s act of creation. He writes, in 
Capita 150, “If the Divine Essence does not in any respect differ  from the Divine Energy, then 
the act of generation and of procession will in no respect differ from the act of creating.”101 
Both creation and the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father include a 
certain coming forth from God. Yet creation - a Divine Energy - is something that takes place 
outside of the Divine Essence, whereas the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy 
Spirit is something takes place within the Divine Essence. Palamas is thus distinguishing 
between that which takes place within or directly pertains to the Essence and that whereby the 
God extends beyond Itself and interacts with creation. 
The distinction between the Divine Essence and the Divine Energies is thus a 
distinction between God as He is in Himself and that whereby He extends beyond Himself and 
interacts directly with His creation. Palamas applies this to the hesychast controversy when he 
says, “This light is not the Essence of God, for that is inaccessible and incommunicable; it is 
not an angel, for it bears the marks of the Master.”102 The light which the practitioners of 
hesychasm claimed to see while praying is not the Divine Essence, for the Divine Essence, 
being transcendent, is incomprehensible and incommunicable. And yet, it must be Divine in 
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nature, and not a created reality, since it has all the marks of something Divine. If the Divine 
Essence is truly transcendent, any experience of the Divine must be of some part of God’s 
existence outside of the Essence.  
This leads to an interesting metaphysical point. Palamas, like Aquinas, accepts a 
participationist model of creation. Yet, Palamas and Aquinas have radically different manners 
in which they express such a vision of creation. For Palamas, God is Good, Wise, or Virtuous 
in a proper sense, and creatures are good, wise, or virtuous insofar as they participate in the 
Perfections or Qualities of God. But, since the Qualities or Perfections of God are distinct from 
the Essence, which is utterly transcendent in relation to creation, what the human person 
participates in is not the Divine Essence Itself. Further, God’s creative activity, whereby God 
establishes the created realm and shares His Perfections with them, is an Energy of God. Now, 
in creating, God establishes a direct point of contact between Himself and creation, and 
becomes present to His creation. If the Divine Essence is transcendent in nature, there can be 
no point of contact between God’s Essence and creation. Therefore, that whereby God creates 
and sustains our existence cannot be the Essence of God. Palamas affirms that creaturely 
existence is a participation in the things of God, but denies that this includes any participation 
in the Essence of God Itself. 
Such a view is rooted in an important theme in Palamite theology, and, more 
specifically, a metaphysical presupposition that underlies Palamas’s thought. For Palamas, to 
participate in a particular essence is to be in possession of that essence. To participate in the 
human essence, for example is to be human. Keeping in mind this line of reasoning, to 
participate in the Divine Essence would make us Divine. Palamas explicitly says as much in 
the Capita 150, “Further, that which participates in something according to its essence must 
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necessarily possess a common essence with that in which it participates and be identical to it in 
some respect. But who has ever heard that God and we possess in some respect the same 
essence? St. Basil the Great says, ‘The Energies of God come down, but the Essence remains 
inaccessible.’”103 The solution, given such a metaphysical worldview, is to say that there is 
something distinct from the Divine Essence whereby God establishes union with His creation. 
No created thing can partake in the Divine Essence, but we can be partakers in the Divine 
Energies.  
There is some controversy, even within Eastern Orthodox circles, concerning the proper 
interpretation of this element of Palamas’s thought. In particular, one controversy is historical 
in nature: how the thought of Palamas relates to similar views held by Maximos the Confessor, 
the Church Father who arguably had the most influence on Palamas’s thought. Maximos’ 
answer to the question of how created beings participate in the Perfections of God lies in his 
doctrine of the logoi. The doctrine of the logoi was seen by Maximos as an inevitable 
consequence of the larger Christian doctrine of creation more generally considered. If the 
world has a specific order to it, and the Cause of this order is, as Christians believe, more than 
simply a vague, impersonal force, but rather has an Intellect and a Will, then this order must 
have somehow existed within God from all of eternity. Maximos provides an in-depth analysis 
of what this means in his Ambigua to John: “[I]t was with reason and wisdom that God brought 
things into existence out of nothing…From all of eternity, He contained within Himself the 
preexisting logoi of created beings. When, in His goodwill, He formed out of nothing the 
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substance of the visible and invisible worlds, He did so on the basis of these logoi.”104 
Maximos also quotes directly from Pseudo-Dionysius, who defines the logoi as “Divine Wills” 
and “predeterminations”.105 The logoi are ideas within the Divine Mind, or intentions within 
God, concerning how God wanted to create each type of thing. As Andrew Louth explains, 
“[T]hey are principles in accordance with which everything in the cosmos was created through 
the Word of God, the Logos.”106 They are, to use the terminology of Lars Thunberg, “the 
presence of the Divine Intention and principle of every single nature and species”.107 
Palamas’s theology of the Divine Energies and their relation to the Divine Essence 
bears many similarities to Maximos’s view of the relation of the logoi to the Divine Essence, 
since Maximos claimed that the logoi are multiple and distinct from the Divine Essemce. 
Thunberg notes how there are some theologians within the Orthodox tradition, such as John 
Meyendorff, who claim that Maximos’s doctrine of the logoi can be interpreted in a Palamite 
manner, and therefore Maximos’s theology was a historical prelude to that of Palamas; others, 
such as Vladimir Lossky, assert that the concept of the logoi is simply another term for the 
uncreated Energies of God, and therefore Maximos and Palamas are saying the same thing in 
different manners. Thunberg notes, however, that Maximos never - at least not explicitly - 
interprets the doctrine of the logoi as Divine Energies. Maximos never (explicitly) says that 
God’s Qualities or Operations are ontologically distinct from His Essence, though Maximos at 
 
104 St. Maximos, Ambigua to John, in On Difficulties in the Church Fathers, vol. 1, edited and translated by 
Nicholas Constas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), pg. 95. 
 
105 Ibid., pg. 195. 
 
106 Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (London: Routledge, 1996), pg. 37. 
 
107 Lars Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos: The Vision of St. Maximus the Confessor (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s 




certain points does speak in a manner similar to that of Palamas.108 Thunberg points to, as an 
example, a passage in the Ambigua to John, in which Maximos says that in perceiving the 
logoi, we also perceive the Divine Energies, writing: “In perceiving naturally all the logoi that 
are in the beings, in the infinite of which it contemplates the Energies of God…” Thunberg 
claims here that Maximos is using the term energeia as a synonym for logoi. The larger context 
is that Maximos is asserting the true distinction between the logoi, and thus Maximos’s 
assertion of the existence of a fundamental relation between the logoi and the Energies of God 
leads him to conclude that the Energies of God are truly distinct. Each logoi represents a 
distinct manner in which God could interact with His creation. Maximos explicitly affirms this, 
saying that “the mind...makes numerous and infinite differences between the different Divine 
Energies it perceives.” The implication here is that the different Activities or Operations of 
God are truly distinct but inseparable. Thunberg admits that the passage in question is a 
difficult one to translate.109 In the translation of the Ambigua to John by Nicholas Constas, it 
reads not “in the infinite of which it contemplates the Energies of God…”, but rather 
“contemplates within them the infinite Energies of God”.110 This implies less of a direct 
identity of the logoi and the Energies, but rather the emphasis is on the notion that the Divine 
Energies are present within the logoi. Constas’s translation does, though, say, “...[I]t [the 
human mind] recognizes the differences of the Divine Energies it perceives to be multiple and - 
to speak truly - infinite.”111 This translation, like the one utilized by Thunberg, implies that the 
relationship between the Divine Energies and the logoi points towards a multiplicity of Divine 
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Energies. This, when looked at in light of Maximos’s belief that the logoi are distinct from the 
Essence of God, would seem to imply that Maximos and Palamas were simply affirming the 
same belief in different manners. 
The Greek Orthodox scholar Nikolaos Ludovikos falls within the camp that states the 
Maximian concept of the logoi and the Palamite notion of the Divine Energies are two different 
manners of making the same point. While this, as our current discussion implies, is a hotly 
debated topic, what does seem to be the case is that both of these theological systems are born 
out of the same general sentiment, which Ludovikos articulates in the following manner: 
 
We thus see that Maximus does not hesitate to make a distinction without any 
ontological separation between the Essence of God and His (always equally 
uncreated) logoi that are His Will acting outside Himself. In Maximus (as well 
as in Palamas many centuries after him), this distinction, precisely because of 
its existential character, cannot be clearly translated into logico-metaphysical 
terms of an autonomous natural theology with its subsequent metaphysics, and 
be called, for example, “formal”, (in the Scotist logico-metaphysical sense of 
the existence of more than one form of a subject, e.g. of God’s Essence and its 
Energies); this happens not only because uncreated essence and uncreated 
logoi/energies coexist without any ontological, or typical, or virtual separation 
(αχωρίστως), but because it is impossible to see [the] logoi “around the 
essence” and [the] essence as two or more logical ‘forms’ of Divine being, 
because they are, in this sense, totally and numerically one, as it is impossible 
to conceive of the existence and the attitude of any personal subject as two or 
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three, united or not, forms of its being - unless one is neurotic! … [C]reated 
things have their existence only through participation in the uncreated 
logoi/acts/wills ‘around God’ - that means in a God willing, loving and acting 
in a relationship outside of Himself.112 
 
Both Palamas and Maximos were motivated by the belief that there is a distinction between 
Who God is in and of Himself and God’s act of extending beyond Himself to interact with His 
creation. These are two distinct aspects of God’s Existence, and therefore are distinct but 
inseparable. These two elements do not constitute two distinct entities; there is only One Entity 
in question, God, and the Essence and the Energies or logoi are two different elements of this 
One Entity. The relationship between God and His Energies or logoi parallels the distinction 
between an individual, considered in themselves, and the thoughts, emotions, intentions, or 
dispositions within that person. The latter are something produced by or which flow forth from 
the former, and are therefore distinct from the former; yet, this distinction does not imply a 
separation, whether real or logical, for each element constitutes one subject. Yet, insofar as this 
distinction is real, Palamas and Maximos can both affirm that the Divine Essence is 
incommunicable, yet still affirm that there is an aspect of God’s Existence that is distinct from 
the Essence which is communicable and participable. 
 
Palamas and Anthropology 
 As said in chapter 2.2, there were a variety of definitions of the imago Dei within the 
Christian tradition. One stream of thought, exemplified by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
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68 
 
Augustine, and Aquinas, associated the image of God with reason. Yet other views were held, 
and sometimes a single theologian could hold several different views, simultaneously 
associating different parts of the human person or different aspects of the human condition 
with the image of God. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, associates the image of God with 
humans imitating or partaking in God’s sovereignty over creation,113 but also with the will114 
and with reason.115  
 Some scholars, including Georgios I. Mantzaridis, have asserted that Palamas does not 
associate the imago Dei with a specific element of human nature, or even with multiple distinct 
elements of human nature, but rather attempted to create a more holistic view, one that 
encompasses the fullness of human nature. Such a tendency is found even within certain strains 
of Patristic thought. Nicholas Constas notes that in some of the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, 
there is a certain hesitancy to pursue a line of reasoning that draws too close a union between 
the imago Dei and the mind. Certain proponents of this line of reasoning, particularly Clement 
of Alexandria and Origen, were described by Constas as being “intellectualist” in orientation, 
that is, they associate imago Dei with, or believe that the imago Dei somehow resides in, the 
intellect. The movement away from such a view was partly motivated by Gregory’s debates 
with the Platonists, and in particular his rejection of the Platonic notion of reincarnation. 
Gregory made use of a line of argumentation based on Aristotle’s matter-form distinction, 
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stating that soul cannot preexist the body since the human person consists in the union of soul 
and body, and humans are only living in the full sense when this union takes place; because of 
this, Gregory concludes that though there are certain qualities or operations unique to the soul 
or the mind, these qualities or operations manifest themselves or play out in and through the 
qualities and operations of the body. Because the soul is not physical, it can be separated from 
the body after death. Yet it is precisely because the soul is not physical that it can continue to 
maintain some sort of metaphysical connection to the body even after death: unlike the body, it 
itself never dies or experiences decay, and hence the soul can separate from the body at death, 
but because it transcends space, the soul can remain connected to the body even if one’s bodily 
remains were scattered. What defines human nature is thus not the soul or the body alone, but 
the union of both.116 
Epiphanius of Salamis, writing around the same time as Gregory of Nyssa, stated that it 
is not of importance to the faith to say exactly with what the imago Dei subsists, but simply to 
affirm that humans are, in fact, as God’s Word says, in His image.117 The Greek Orthodox 
scholar Gregorios Mantzaridis, commenting on this teaching, writes that the image of God is 
“not confined to one facet nor is it fully represented by one aspect of human nature, but is 
expressed and manifested, as through a prism, throughout the whole of human existence.”118 
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 This carries over into the thought of Palamas. Gregory Palamas, in the words of 
Mantzaridis, has a “many-sided and dynamic conception of ‘image’”.119 This, at first, is not 
entirely evident when one analyzes the Palamite system of thought, since Palamas, like Origen, 
Clement, Augustine, and Aquinas, sees a close relationship between reason and the imago Dei. 
Yet, Palamas frames the imago Dei within a larger metaphysical and anthropological 
framework that gives this concept a greater level of depth. 
 As with Aquinas, Palamas sees a distinction between the image and likeness of God. 
Palamas suggests that as the mind overcomes the passions, it is given a greater ability to 
cultivate the virtues. As it cultivates the virtues, its understanding of reality becomes clearer, 
which can be seen in the fact that it better comprehends intelligible or spiritual realities, 
realities which transcend what is immediately perceptible but which metaphysically undergird 
reality as it is immediately seen. Moral growth thus always leads to epistemic growth, the 
epitome of which is the vision of God. In Palamas’s epistemology, the first thing the mind 
comprehends - and the easiest for it to comprehend - is physical or sensual things. The mind 
then grows to comprehend realities of a spiritual or intelligible nature; yet, the mind, when it 
first envisions intelligible realities, pictures them in physical terms, associating them with 
images, something which is then replaced with the ability to conceptualize intelligible realities 
in purely non-physical terms. The culmination of such a process is the human mind, by the 
grace of God, being able to directly see God in His Energies. The process of epistemological or 
noetic growth is, at its core, a process of the mind detaching itself from earthly things, a 
process which allows it to see He Who  transcends all earthly realities - a Reality that, for 





that the proper state of the mind is that in which it detaches itself from or transcends all 
concepts and categories in order to directly see God. This capacity to understand reality, and 
ultimately its Source (God) is identified with the imago Dei. Yet, Palamas goes on to quote 
Diadochos, who asserted that there are two effects of Baptism, namely the forgiveness of sins 
(which is an immediate effect), and an increased consciousness of the Presence of God (a long-
term effect harvested through a lifelong cooperation with Divine grace). Diadochos explicitly 
identifies this process of increasing our awareness and knowledge of God with the human 
likeness to God.120  
 Palamas, in a word, identifies the image of God with our ability to know God, and the 
likeness of God with different degrees of actual knowledge of God. This is born out of two 
underlying presuppositions: firstly, the belief - which is the common property of the Christian 
tradition - that God is a rational and immaterial Being, and therefore exists as pure spirit or 
pure mind (the conclusion of which is that the human person imitates God most in searching 
for truth); secondly, a belief that is particularly prominent in Palamite views on deification, 
namely that it is in experiencing God that we are transformed by God. Put another way, the 
ability to know God is that in which the image of God rests, but to the extent that this ability to 
know is actualized, we see the image of God within us intensify its likeness to its Divine 
archetype. 
 Palamas, like Augustine and Aquinas, saw the image of God as being inherently 
Trinitarian in nature. He even uses a variant of the psychological analogy employed by 
Augustine and Aquinas. He spells out the Trinitarian element of the imago Dei in one of his 
central texts, the Capita. For Palamas, God exists as Pure Mind, and begotten by God is the 
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Logos of God, which Palamas defined as the “Intelligence-content” of God. That is to say, the 
Divine Logos is the thought of God produced by God the Father knowing Himself. Palamas 
further states that it would be absurd for mind to exist without life. The Holy Spirit is therefore 
the Divine Life within God. Yet, Palamas creates a close connection between the concept of 
the Divine Life and the concept of the Love of God. Therefore, Palamas defines the Holy Spirit 
as “a kind of ineffable yet intense longing or eros experienced by the Begetter [of the Word] 
for the Logos born ineffably from Him…” The Father, in seeing the Son, sees His own 
Goodness reflected in the Son, and therefore loves the Son. Now, while this sounds similar to 
the view of Augustine and Aquinas, Palamas does not see this as something implying the 
filioque, for the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit are coextensive with 
one another. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father in the same act whereby the Father 
begets the Son. While Palamas admits that the Son receives and reciprocates the Love of the 
Father towards Him, the Son already possesses this Love simply by virtue of being begotten by 
the Father. The mutual nature of the Holy Spirit therefore reflects the function of the Holy 
Spirit and the fact that He has a fundamental relationship to both the Father and the Son rather 
than His ontological origin.121 
The Inner Life of the Trinity is reflected in the human person in the following manner: 
in the human person, one sees the intellect, which is comparable to the Father; within the 
intellect is the mind’s knowledge of God. The mind’s knowledge of God, considered in itself, 
is distinct from the mind considered in itself, just as the Father is distinct from the Son. Yet, 
just as the Father begets the Son, so too the mind’s knowledge of God comes forth from the 
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mind, in that knowledge of God is impossible without reason. This thus makes the mind’s 
knowledge of God comparable to the Son as the Perfect Image of the Father. Finally, in the act 
of reflecting upon itself, and in doing so reflecting upon its knowledge of God, a sense of love 
for God comes forth.122 Now, this is distinguished from the Western model insofar as the 
Father, in begetting the Son, sees His Goodness perfectly reflected in the Son, and therefore 
loves the Son; the love shared between the Father and the Son therefore originates with the 
Father. The Holy Spirit, in terms of its ontological origin, is associated with the Father and not 
the Son. Insofar as the Son receives and reciprocates this love, the Holy Spirit can, in Palamite 
thought (and Byzantine thought more generally), be associated with both the Father and the 
Son, but the Holy Spirit originates from the Father alone. Likewise, the mind’s love for itself 
originates from the mind itself. It doesn’t trace its ontological origin to both the mind and the 
mind’s thought of itself. 
 Even though there were some differences between Palamas’s Trinitarian theology and 
that of his Western contemporary which in turn led to nuanced differences in terms of how 
they saw the Trinity reflected in the human person, both Aquinas and Palamas saw the core of 
the image of God within the human person as being expressed in the human ability to know 
and to love its Creator. Yet, Palamas does not stop with identifying the imago Dei with a 
specific quality or capacity within human nature. This was born out of a larger theological and 
philosophical mindset: Palamas sees the essence-energies distinction not only as something 
describing the Inner Life of God, but also as a philosophical tool that could be used to describe 
certain metaphysical realities even within creation. For Palamas, the ability to know and love 
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God is an energy proceeding from a specific nature. Hence, while Palamas explicitly connects 
the imago Dei with certain specific qualities or capacities, he also sees the image of God as 
referring to something broader than simply a specific set of qualities or capacities: it also points 
towards an underlying nature configured in such a way so as to allow the human person to 
imitate God. Unique to each nature is a set of energies that are defined by the general 
ontological structure of that nature. Knowing and loving God can thus be viewed as energies 
that are unique to human nature as a nature created in the imago Dei.123 
 
Palamas on Grace and Deification 
 Like all major Christian theologians before him, Palamas believes that while the human 
person, by nature, is oriented towards the end of union with God, because of the reality of 
Divine transcendence and the supernatural nature of God’s Essence, as well as the reality of 
human sin, the full actualization of this potential requires Divine grace. Palamas has a very 
systematically consistent understanding of the nature of grace which builds off of his more 
general vision of God and how God relates to the human race. For Palamas, grace is a Divine 
Energy whereby God brings about union between Himself and the faithful Christian. Palamas 
asserts in his Letter to the Most Reverend Nun Xenia that the early stage of repentance is 
defined by grief, a sense of sorrow for our sin. Sin produces what Palamas - building off of the 
thought of Basil the Great and Mark the Ascetic - calls a darkness of the mind. Humans only 
sin once they have become blinded to the true moral and spiritual character of their actions 
(which is itself a form of mental darkness), and the more one sins, the more this darkness 
grows. This can be seen in the fact that the sinner usually does not fully comprehend, or is 
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indifferent towards, the sinful nature of their thoughts, actions, words or desires, or is too weak 
to overcome them if they do recognize their sin. This darkness leads to a state of grief and 
anguish, but this state of anguish in turn can lead to one of two other states of the soul: it can 
either lead to a sense of despair or hopelessness, or, conversely, it can lead us recognize the 
depravity of our situation and desire the mercy of God. It is the latter that constitutes the first 
stage of repentance. This stage of repentance is described by Palamas as “painful,” since it is 
often “conjoined with the fear of God,” that is, a fear of God’s wrath and punishment. Yet, 
such fear eventually gives way to a sense of love for God. The reason for this is because, 
Palamas argues, implicit to our desire for mercy is a desire to be united to God, and God does 
not reject those who sincerely seek Him. This desire for union with God Palamas, based on the 
words of Scripture, compares to the desire of one spouse for another.124 As Palamas writes: 
 
In addition, the initial stage of grief resembles something that appears to be 
almost unattainable - a kind of petition for betrothal to God. Thus those who 
grieve in their longing for the Bridegroom to Whom they are not yet united 
utter as it were certain words of courtship, smiting themselves and calling 
upon Him with tears as though He were not present and perhaps may never 
be present. But the consummation of grief is pure bridal union with the 
Bridegroom. For this reason St. Paul, after describing the married couple’s 
union in one flesh as a ‘great mystery’, added, ‘but I say this with respect to 
Christ and the Church’ (Ephesians 5:32). As they are one flesh, so those who 
are with God are one spirit, as St. Paul clearly testifies elsewhere when he 
 




says that he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit with Him (cf. 1 Corinthians 
6:17).125 
 
The first step in release from darkness is a recognition of the fact that we are spiritually lost, 
together with a desire to return to God, something that is impossible in our sinful state. A 
sincere spirit of repentance includes a desire for God that is so strong that Palamas, building off 
of the words of St. Paul, states that it is comparable to the love of a husband for a wife. Such a 
desire for God is fulfilled only in union with God.  
God dwells in the soul of each person who sincerely calls out to Him for His mercy. 
That whereby God dwells in the soul of each believer is an Energy of God, a Divine Operation. 
It is because the Operations or Actions of God are distinct from the Divine Essence that God 
can be close to His creation through grace while also remaining transcendent. Yet, it is 
precisely because Palamas accepts such a definition of grace that he can reject certain Western 
Christian, including (and especially) Thomistic, views on grace. As stated earlier, Aquinas 
made a distinction between uncreated and created grace, with the former referring to the Love 
of God for man (an uncreated reality), and the latter referring to the effects of such Love within 
the human soul (a created reality). Yet, insofar as Palamas has a much more limited 
understanding of grace, one centered on the notion of grace as God dwelling in the soul of the 
individual believer, he also makes a strong distinction between grace as such and the effects of 
grace. While Palamas admits that grace is an uncreated reality, whereas the effects of grace are 
a created reality, he rejects any definition of grace wherein both grace and its effects on the 
human soul are grouped together under the title of “grace.” 
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 Palamas explicitly says as much: “What are we to say, then, to those who regard the 
grace that dwells in God’s saints as created? Let them know that they blaspheme against the 
Spirit Himself Who, in giving His grace, is united to the saints.”126 Palamas goes further, 
asserting that the multiplicity of Divine Energies makes possible a multiplicity of manners in 
which God, present to the saints through grace, operates. An example he uses is the seven gifts 
of the Holy Spirit, which he interprets as distinct Energies of the Spirit.127 Because energies are 
distinct yet inseparable from the essence which produces them, energies reflect the essences 
which produce them. If the Divine Essence is uncreated, then so, too, are the Divine Energies, 
including grace. Palamas writes, “Yet no intelligent person would suppose that grace, here 
distinguished from the Divine Nature, is created, for obviously no one would be in any danger 
of supposing a created thing to be the Divine Nature.”128 If grace is a created reality, then so, 
too, would the Divine Nature be a created reality; if, on the other hand, the Divine Essence is 
an uncreated reality, then grace, it follows, must also be an uncreated reality. 
 One could question whether this critique, when applied to Aquinas himself, is justified. 
To some degree, it is simply a matter of difference in terminology and emphasis. Aquinas is 
simply using a broader definition of the term “grace”: grace is a gift; thus, both God’s Mercy, 
Love or Favor, as well as the effects thereof, can be referred to by the title of “grace”. What is 
more, it is obvious that Aquinas, like Palamas, would deny that God’s Mercy, Love or Favor is 
itself something created, nor is the Divine Presence in the human soul brought about by grace a 
created thing. Things such as the infused virtues, as they are exhibited in the graced soul, may 
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be considered created realities, and may be called - if we are to accept the general parameters 
of Thomistic terminology - a “grace,” but created grace, in this sense, does not imply that 
everything classified as “grace”, or the Divine Essence, or the Divine Actions or Operations, 
are created. 
 While Palamas has a high degree of systematic precision with regard to the nature of 
grace and its relation to the Divine Essence, his thought becomes less clear-cut as it pertains to 
the human side of this question, that is, how grace and free will relate to one another. 
Gregory’s thought on that matter was not as well defined as it was in the West, mainly on 
account of several historical factors, two in specific: firstly, Pelagianism was never as 
widespread in the East as it was in the West; secondly, the Reformation - some of the hot 
button debates within which included debates on justification and predestination, which, in 
turn, like the debates surrounding Pelagianism, brought into the fore debates on the relationship 
between grace and free will - was something that emerged within the Western church and 
which arose mainly in response to certain issues within the Western Church. The two most 
theologically intense debates on the relationship between grace and free will were thus never 
the center of attention for the Byzantine Church. Like in the West, the Orthodox Church 
simultaneously affirms two ideas: firstly, that salvation is something utterly dependent on the 
grace of God, and secondly, since humans have free will, we also bear a certain level of moral 
responsibility. Yet, due to above the historical circumstances, the question of how to reconcile 
these ideas was never as precisely defined. This paradox was only intensified by the fact that 
while the West also had a strong monastic tradition, monasticism was central to Eastern 
Christian spirituality. The strong emphasis on ascesis that defined monastic spirituality also 
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permeates the spiritual writings of the East more generally; nonetheless, this does not 
undermine the gratuitousness of salvation in the Eastern view. 
Palamas thus sees no need to fit his views on grace and their relationship to free will 
within the parameters of an Augustinian or post-Augustinian framework. As a result, it is easy 
for Western audiences to misinterpret or misrepresent the thought of Palamas on this matter. 
A.N. Williams notes that growth in virtue was such an important part of his vision of 
deification that in the Palamite tradition virtue is a “cognate” of deification.129 Yet, just 
because virtue is one of the central elements of the Palamite vision of deification, and the 
relationship between virtue and grace is articulated in a manner that does not resonate with the 
Western (Catholic and Protestant) intellectual ethos, does not imply that his thought is Pelagian 
or quasi-Pelagian. Georgios Mantzaridis writes,  
 
Release from this vicious cycle [of sin] is achieved only through the imitation 
of Christ and participation in His life. … The notion of imitation of Christ, so 
often met with in morals and moral treatises, is easily misunderstood. If we 
allow that man is able by himself to imitate the God-man, then we obviously 
overestimate man’s power and align ourselves with the Pelagian or Messalian 
heresies. If, again, we dismiss the possibility of an imitation of Christ, we 
make nonsense the notion of ‘cooperation’ and overlook a basic teaching of 
Scripture and the Fathers.130 
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To say that humans can imitate Christ by their own power alone, without any assistance from 
God, is an outright theological error. Yet, to reject the human ability to imitate Christ would be 
to reject the notion that humanity has a moral obligation to cooperate with the grace of God, 
which is seen as a fundamental teaching of both Scripture and the Fathers. Palamas reconciles 
these two truth claims in a more subtle, indirect manner. He, for example, will at times 
describe deification as a result of humanity assimilating itself to God, which it does by lovingly 
obeying the Divine commands, and, in other places, he will (quoting from Basil the Great) 
describe deification as a “reward” for a life of virtue.131 Yet, in other places, Gregory will say 
that a life of virtue can bring us to the verge of deification, but cannot actually lead to 
deification; the crossing of the threshold separating man’s current state from the fully deified 
state is a result of grace.132 Here, Palamas clearly sees virtue as a preparation for deification, 
but not as something that in itself can actually bring about deification. It is for this reason that 
Palamas explicitly states that deification does not rest solely or even primarily in virtue: “Do 
not imagine that deification is simply the possession of the virtues; rather, it resides in the 
radiance and grace of God, which actually comes to us through the virtues.”133 The virtues can 
therefore be seen as instrumental causes of our deification, things which can prepare us for the 
deified state but which cannot, in themselves, make us partakers in the Divine Life. 
 In a word, Palamas believes that through sin, human knowledge of God is darkened and 
our union with God was thrown into disarray. Through repentance, the sinner develops a 
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yearning for God, an openness to the Divine Presence which they lost through sin. Those with 
a truly repentant spirit thus showcase an openness to God, and those who exhibit such an 
openness receive God’s grace. God’s grace, for Palamas, is seen as an Activity of God 
whereby God becomes present in the soul of the individual believer, thereby sanctifying them. 
The more one grows in holiness, the more they harness or make use of God’s graces, thereby 
allowing us to become more and more permeated by them. The spiritual life is thus seen by 
Palamas as a continual process of being permeated by the Divine Presence to ever greater 
degrees, which culminates in the fully deified state. In the fully deified or glorified state, there 
is perfect union between the rational creature and God. In such a state, the deified soul is 
perfectly receptive to the Energies of God, and is permeated in every part of their being by 
these Divine Energies. Such a vision of salvation is an inevitable result of the broader Palamite 
vision: the Energies of God are that which creates and sustains our existence. To be perfected 
















 AQUINAS AND PALAMAS - A SIDE-BY-SIDE ANALYSIS  
The role of grace in the systematic relationship between deification and creation can be 
seen in the maxim “grace perfects nature.” The Christian tradition presupposes a real 
distinction between the natural and supernatural realms, between the realm in which the human 
race was created and that state to which it is elevated by grace. Nonetheless, grace presupposes 
a created nature which has a certain receptivity to this supernatural elevation. It is for this 
reason that the gift of grace, and God’s larger plan of salvation, is directed towards rational 
creatures alone: only the rational creature was created with the capacity for union with God; 
only the rational creature was created with the capacity to willingly choose to deviate from 
such an end, and only the rational creature could return to the path leading to their proper end 
after deviating from it. In some strains of Christianity, particularly in the East, the entirety of 
the created order is seen as being encompassed by God’s saving plan. Kallistos Ware speaks of 
a ceremony in the Eastern Orthodox Church associated with the Feast of Epiphany, in which 
the celebrant throws a cross into a body of water to be retrieved by a group of swimmers. In 
this ceremony, the water is believed to be blessed by the presence of the cross. What this 
signifies is the sanctification not only of the human person, but of creation as a whole. This 
points towards the “cosmic significance” of Christ’s plan of salvation, how Christ’s plan of 
salvation can be seen as “embracing the whole created order.” Ware goes further and states 
that, while human Baptism represents our cleansing, Christ, when entering into the water in His 
Baptism, purifies it, and this, in turn, plays on the larger theme of the Incarnation: it signifies 
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how Jesus, in entering into the created order, sanctifies it.134 This builds off of the notion found 
in Revelation 21:1 of a “new heaven and new earth” being brought into existence when God’s 
plan of salvation reaches its culmination or final manifestation in the End Times. Nonetheless, 
the cosmic vision of deification - that notion that creation as a whole will be more closely 
united to God and will therefore reflect the Glory of God in a greater manner - does not imply 
that non-rational creatures have immortal souls or will attain the level of likeness to God found 
in creatures with the imago Dei. Because deification and the beatific vision presupposes the 
presence of the imago Dei in the soul, the relation between the state of nature and the deified 
state is not seen as an opposition but rather a transcendence. It is for this reason that one’s view 
of creation can be seen as delineating the broad parameters of one’s view of salvation and 
deification. 
By looking at both the Thomistic and the Palamite visions of creation/anthropology, grace and 
deification, we see how the close systematic relationship between creation and deification is 
present in the two thinkers who in many ways epitomize their respective ecclesial-theological 
traditions. For Thomas, deification is union with God, a union in which we partake in the 
Divine Essence, as a result of which we imitate God. The fact that Aquinas frames deification 
in such a manner can easily be seen as resulting from the Thomistic view of how God interacts 
with creation: God’s causal activity is present to all things, and by this the Perfections of God 
are communicated to creation. Yet, the Perfections of God are communicated to created beings 
in a specific manner and to a specific degree. Therefore, created realities embody not goodness 
or wisdom as such, but specific modes of being good or wise. Created beings thus partake in 
the Perfections of God in an analogous manner, relative to the manner in which God exhibits 
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these Perfections. Creaturely existence is therefore an analogous participation in that which 
properly belongs to God. While Aquinas sees the fully deified state as transcending the natural 
state, Aquinas also sees the fully deified/glorified state, like the created state, as including 
participation in God. Yet, the glorified state is transcendent of the created realm, since it is a 
state in which we perfectly know, perfectly love, and are in a state of perfect union with God. 
Nonetheless, since all levels of human existence, both natural and deified, include a certain 
level of union with God, one sees in Thomas’s thought the notion that our union with God in 
the deified state is, like in our natural state, an analogous participation in the Perfections of 
God. This can be seen as an inevitable conclusion of the more general Thomistic teaching. 
Deification is not understood by Aquinas as those in heaven having a likeness to God whereby 
we perfectly mirror God. Not only is this clear in Thomas’s teaching on creation and 
anthropology - in which he makes a distinction between humanity being “to the likeness of 
God,” but Christ alone being “in the Image of God,” or being the “image of God” in the proper 
sense - but is also true with regard to man’s supernatural participation brought about by grace. 
This is said in a multiplicity of manners, both implicitly and explicitly, by both Aquinas and 
his commentators. In the Summa Theologiæ I-II, Q. 112, A. 2, Aquinas defines deification as 
“a partaking in the Divine Nature by a certain participated likeness.”135 When looked at in light 
of such passages from the Summa Theologiæ as I-II, Q. 109, A. 3, reply to objection 1, and II-
II, Q. 23, A. 1, respondeo, Aquinas believes that in the spiritual state in which one is fully 
deified, the saints not merely are in union with God in the broad metaphysical sense that allows 
for creaturely existence more generally, but are in a state of fellowship with God, whereby they 
attains a higher level of participation in the Divine Nature, and therefore a greater level of 
 
135 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ I-II, Q. 112, A. 2 respondeo, pg. 1140 
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likeness to that to which we are united. Yet, it is a participated likeness: that is to say, that of 
which we have a likeness is something that, properly speaking, inheres to God, but which is 
present in us, or which we imitate, by virtue of union and participation. 
That is to say, that which is inherent or natural to God is something outside of or 
external to the human person. Through grace, we are united and conformed to Christ, and thus 
become partakers of His Sonship, in which state the Father becomes present within the human 
soul and therefore causes humans to become united to Himself. Yet, unlike in the case of 
Christ, that which we are united to is not consubstantial with us. Deification does not 
undermine the fact the deified soul remains a creature and God remains God. Thus, the deified 
soul has a likeness to God that takes place because of a certain participation in a reality outside 
of and above us. 
         Put another way, humanity imitates and participates in the Divine Nature as sons of 
God in Christ; yet, we can never participate in the Divine Nature in the same manner or to the 
same extent as Christ does. Garrigou-Langrange thus writes,  
 
From all eternity God the Father has a Son to Whom He communicates His 
Whole Nature, without dividing or multiplying It; He necessarily engenders a 
Son equal to Himself, and gives to Him to be God of God, Light of Light, 
true God of true God. And from sheer bounty, gratuitously, He has willed to 
have in time other sons, adopted sons, by a filiation which is not only moral 
(by external declaration) but real and intimate (by production of sanctifying 
grace, the effect of God’s active love for us). … It is thus that He has 
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predestined us to be conformable to the image of His only Son, that this Son 
might be the first-born of many brethren (Romans 8:29).  The just are 
accordingly of the family of God and enter the inner cycle of the Trinity. 
Infused charity gives us a likeness to the Holy Ghost (personal love); the 
beatific vision will render us like the Word, Who will make us like unto the 
Father Whose Image He is.136 
 
Deification thus rests in union with Christ, by which we become partakers in His Divine 
Sonship. Just as the Son has a certain likeness to the Father because He is the Son of the Father, 
likewise those who are deified are given a likeness to God because of our adopted sonship. 
Through this adopted sonship, we are filled with the Holy Spirit, Who, as that love shared 
between the Father and the Son, is the means by which the Love of God is communicated to 
humanity; through this adopted sonship, we also have an increased knowledge of God, and it is 
this knowledge which transforms us to have an increased likeness to our Object. Yet, since that 
in Whose likeness we become in the deified state is infinitely transcendent in relation to 
creation, Garrigou-Lagrange thus nuances these above claims: “...[W]e consider sanctifying 
grace to be a formal, analogical participation in Deity as it is in itself.”137 Further, “Sanctifying 
grace...is an analogical likeness to God inasmuch as He is God, or to His Deity, to His intimate 
life, which is not naturally knowable in a positive way.”138  
 
136 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Ia IIae, 
Q. 109-119, pg. 405 
 
137 Ibid., pg. 409 
 
138 Ibid., pg. 405 
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 In the thought of Thomas and the Thomistic tradition more generally, both creation and 
deification include God sharing His qualities with creation. Everything creation is and has 
results from creation participating in that which properly is attributed to God. This reality - that 
of creation participating in the Perfections of God - defines the very nature of creaturely 
existence, and is intensified by grace in the deified state. Yet, since that which the human 
person participates in has its origins outside of creation, in a Source which is infinitely 
transcendent of created realities, humanity shares in these qualities insofar as we participate in 
them, that is, share in something outside of the self. Our likeness to the Perfections of God is 
thus a participated likeness. Further, as humans participate in the things of God, we do not 
embody these qualities in the same manner or to the same extent as God does, and therefore we 
can never perfectly imitate God. Our likeness to and participation in the Perfections of God is 
therefore analogous. This is something Aquinas applies to both creation and deification. It is 
thus clear here how Thomistic metaphysics more generally, and the Thomistic vision of 
creation more specifically, sets the doctrinal and systematic framework for the Thomistic view 
of deification.  
 What is said of Thomas is also said of Palamas: his vision of creation and how God 
relates to His creation lays the basis for the doctrinal and systematic context of Palamas’s 
vision of deification. Nonetheless, the specifics of how Palamas treats this are radically 
different than how Aquinas and his ideological disciples do so. Aquinas reconciles Divine 
transcendence and Divine immanence by asserting that God is present to and operative within 
creation as that which creates and upholds the existence of a thing; yet, God is present to and at 
work within creation in such a way so as to not - for the lack of a better term - ontologically 
“merge” with the essence of a created thing, thereby allowing for rather strong and radical 
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articulations of Divine immanence that also allows for God to be distinct from His creation. 
Because God is present to creation in such a way, our participation in and likeness to God is 
therefore analogous. Palamas, on the other hand, sees Divine transcendence as ruling out any 
possibility of direct contact between God’s Essence and creation, and therefore must assert that 
there is an element of God’s existence which serves as an ontological mediator between the 
innermost part of God’s Existence (His transcendent and supra-essential Essence), and His 
creation. While Aquinas, in De potentia, sees creation as a result of the operations of Divine 
Power and the presence of the effects of such operations within creation - to use Eastern 
terminology, a Divine Energy - Aquinas also makes it clear that the Divine Power (or Its 
operations) are not something distinct from the Divine Essence. (Something similar could be 
said about the process of sanctification, and the culmination of such a process in deification.) 
Further, Aquinas, as stated in chapter 2.1, makes use of the Augustinian notion that God being 
present to the world is distinct from asserting that God is a part of the world. Creation and 
deification are, to different degrees, a participation in the Divine Essence. Yet, presupposed by 
Palamas is the notion that to participate in a particular essence is to be properly in possession 
of that essence. To be human is to participate in the human essence; likewise, to be Divine is to 
participate in the Divine Essence. It is for this reason that Palamas believes that creaturely 
existence, as well as deification, include a participation in God, but it is not a direct 
participation in the Divine Essence. 
 In both Palamas and Aquinas, the broad metaphysical parameters of how they envision 
the metaphysical relationship between God and creation creates the framework for how they 
envision the deified state. Yet, what we also are led to conclude is that these two thinkers 
express two radically different ways of approaching the relationship between God and man 
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within the context of creation, which leads to two radically different ways of articulating the 
relationship between God and creation within the context of deification. Again, for Palamas, 
any direct participation in the Divine Essence on the part of creation undermines Divine 
transcendence. What one thus needs is an element of God’s Existence which serves as an 
ontological mediator between the Divine Essence and creation. Such are the operations which 
proceed from the Divine Essence. Both creation and deification result from, and can be defined 
as a participation in, these Divine Energies. The Divine Energies are that whereby a 
transcendent God becomes present to and operates within creation. Deification, for Palamas 
and the Palamites - and for the Byzantine tradition more generally - is thus an increased 
participation in and union with the creational activity of God. For Thomas, the solution to the 
problem is the concept of analogous participation and analogous likeness: all of created reality 
is united to God and participates in the Perfections of God. Yet, humans can never exhibit the 
Qualities or Perfections of God in the same manner as God does. Therefore, humans can never 
have a perfect likeness to God, which would imply equality with God and therefore undermine 
the doctrine of Divine transcendence. 
 By analyzing the relationship between the doctrine of creation and that of deification, 
we begin to better understand the inner systematic structure of the doctrine of deification. In 
doing so, one may begin to realize that the notion that the deified state transcends the created 
state should not lead one to view deification, and soteriology in general, in isolation from the 
doctrine of creation. In the deified state, as in the state of nature, we continue to exist as 
creatures, and therefore continue to relate to God as His creation. Insofar as the Creator-
creation dynamic continues to exist in the deified state - admitting, nonetheless, that such a 
relationship is radically transformed by grace - how one understands or articulates the 
90 
 
underlying metaphysical parameters of how God and humans relate in the natural realm is 
determinative of how one envisions the deified state. Recognizing that the doctrine of creation 
is a necessary precondition for the doctrine of deification demonstrates the holistic nature of 
Christian theology; but, what is more, comparing how this fact plays out in different 
theological traditions has profound ecumenical implications. 
 In particular, what is at stake when comparing Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition with 
Palamas and the Palamite tradition is the fact these two thinkers and the respective traditions 
that emerge from them approximate each other in rather interesting manners, yet underlying 
these similarities is a radically different set of metaphysical implications. They both believe 
that deification is a result of grace, whereby the love and presence of a transcendent God fills 
the soul. Yet, how this transcendent God becomes present to His creation is explained in 
radically different manners, manners determined by their vision of God and His relation to 
creation more generally. Both Thomas and Palamas attempted to make sense of certain realities 
which are, in many ways, the common property of the entire Christian tradition, Catholic and 
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